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Abstract 
 
This  practicum  examines  my  experiences  at  a  small 
software  development  company  and  uses  lessons 
learned to substantiate strategies for coping with the 
three  challenges  of  software  sales,  adoption,  and 
enhancement.    After  an  introduction,  this  practicum 
presents a narrative background of my experiences.  It 
then  discusses  each  of  three  strategies  by  first 
describing relevant experiences, and then interpreting 
and  generalizing  the  experiences  with  an  eye  to 
highlighting  the  strengths  and  weaknesses  of  each 
strategy.  Finally, this practicum examines the extent to 
which engineers should allow these considerations to 
shift their focus from software to business. 
 
The main thrust of these lessons is that good engineers 
collaborate  with  customers.    They  attempt  to 
understand the non-technical pressures on customers, 
including  their  work,  and  then  focus  on  motivating 
customers to use and extend the system.  As such, this 
practicum highlights the importance of considering the 
business context when engineering software. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
From  1998  through  the  end  of  2000,  I  worked  as  a 
software  developer  at  P-Corp,  a  small  company  that 
developed software for delivering surveys to patients at 
clinics.    Each  of  these  surveys,  along  with  various 
calculation  modules  and  reports,  was  targeted  at  a 
specific  patient  population,  such  as  chemical 
dependency  patients.    We  tracked  patients'  self-
reported  well-being  in  order  to  provide  feedback  to 
clinicians regarding their patients' progress. 
 
Working at P-Corp gave me my first extensive software 
development experience outside academia.  As such, it 
taught me a number of lessons about how the business 
context affects the software development process.  In 
talking with other developers since then, I have come 
to  realize  that  many  of  these  lessons  are  not  widely 
understood.   
 
This  dearth  of  understanding  is  unfortunate,  since 
engineering  is  about  more  than  building  exciting 
technology. Instead, engineering is about providing an 
efficient, economical solution to a need.  Consequently, 
successful  engineering  demands  an  ability  to  tie 
technical  artifacts  inside  the  computer  to  business 
problems in the real world outside the computer. 
 
1.2 Summary 
 
This practicum documents the lessons I have learned in 
an attempt to help correct this lack of understanding.  
The  discussion  throughout  assumes  that  you  are  an 
engineer  attempting  to  develop  software  for  a  client 
who has numerous users. 
 
Section 2 narrates my experiences at P-Corp, in order 
to provide the background from which I have extracted 
my lessons.  These lessons are organized around three 
questions and corresponding strategies. 
 
Sections  3  through  5  each  cover  one  of  these  three 
question-strategy  pairs.    Each  section  begins  by 
introducing  specific  examples  from  my  experience.  
These  are then generalized into an abstract question, 
which I answer using a strategy embodying several key 
lessons.    Each  section  closes  by  considering  the 
strengths  and  dangers  of  the  strategy.    The  three 
questions and strategies follow: 
 
Section 3 
Q:  "They liked our sales presentation.  How can we 
get them to sign on the dotted line?" 
A:  “Identify and leverage the tangential concerns via 
features to boost position.” 
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Section 4 
Q:  "They refuse to use the software.  What do I do?" 
A:  “Study  your  users  to  anticipate  needs,  and  add 
functionality in a modular fashion.” 
 
Section 5 
Q:  "My  firm  cannot  allocate  more  resources.    How 
can I enhance the software?" 
A:  “Motivate  your  clients  to  boost  your  system's 
attractiveness for you.” 
 
Section  6  ties  together  material from throughout this 
document to answer two higher-level questions.  In a 
sense,  these  are  meta-questions  about  the 
appropriateness  of  the  three  questions  I  have  listed 
above and answered in this document. 
 
Q:  "To what extent are these three questions specific 
to software engineering?" 
Q:  "To what extent are these three questions central to 
software engineering?" 
 
Section  7  summarizes  the  practicum  and  proposes  a 
number of directions for future study or research in this 
area. 
 
2. Narrative 
 
2.1 Business milieu 
 
Minds break in many ways, such as anxiety disorders, 
eating  disorders,  mood  disorders,  chemical 
dependency, schizophrenia, and dementia.  Catastrophe 
can  result,  often  involving  unemployment, 
homelessness,  incarceration,  violence,  and  even 
suicide.    “The  economic  cost  to  [American]  society 
from  alcohol  and drug abuse was an estimated $246 
billion  in  1992”  [2];  this  does  not  even  include  the 
effects  of  depression,  anxiety,  neuroses,  and  a  wide 
range  of  mental  illnesses  apart  from  chemical 
dependency.  Yet even these intolerable costs pale in 
comparison to the heartache and personal loss that has 
eviscerated the spirit from millions of lives over many 
generations. 
 
The  emotional  need  raised  by  this  problem  has 
provoked  a  heartfelt  response.    Millions  of  people 
became clinicians seeking to heal these mental illnesses 
using various techniques.  As of 2001, the “community 
and  social  service  occupations”  employed  over  1.5 
million  people,  most  of  them  providing  counseling, 
therapy, education, or spiritual guidance [3]. 
 
Unfortunately, despite the dedication of workers in this 
industry, and despite vast investments into treatments 
like community and social service, patient problems are 
not  always  permanently  resolved.    In  1992, 
“specialized services for the treatment of alcohol and 
drug  problems  cost  $5.6  billion  and  $4.4  billion, 
respectively”  (including  detoxification  and  other 
treatment  costs  in  addition  to  counseling)  [2].      Yet 
over  10%  of  chemical  dependency  patients  relapse 
during  the  first  month  alone  [4].    In  other  words, 
despite  the  high  costs  of  treatment,  patients  do  not 
uniformly get better and stay better. 
 
One  cause  for  this  lack  of  success  may  be  that  the 
mental health care industry generally has not measured 
outcomes in the past.  A software engineer might say 
that they have not yet reached the fourth level of the 
Capability Maturity Model.  Although most health care 
organizations  provide  services  in  a  repeatable  and 
defined fashion, they generally do not have any tools or 
procedures  in  place  to  characterize  and  quantify  a 
"successful" treatment.   
 
In the early 1990's, researchers laid the foundation for 
applying  Outcomes  Management  (OM)  to  the  health 
care industry.  A variety of surveys were developed for 
individual patients to answer; these answers were then 
collected into scales and correlated against outcomes of 
interest.    This  budding  field  offers  the  promise  of 
tracking  outcomes  as  the  clinic  tweaks  its  treatment 
process, thereby allowing the organization to determine 
whether to keep or discard incremental innovations.  In 
short, OM claims to provide a road for gradual clinical 
process improvement. 
 
Today, our society would benefit from higher quality 
mental  health  care.    OM  offers  a  start  in  the  right 
direction.  
 
2.2 P-Corp overview 
 
Previous OM research had utilized surveys encoded in 
paper-and-pencil  instruments.    While  this  served  the 
purpose  of  developing  and  validating  scales,  a 
software-based version would offer more value for use 
in  real-world  settings.    P-Corp  was  one  of  the  first 
companies to introduce clinical OM software, initially 
targeting  the  chemical  dependency  market.    The 
business plan contained several key steps: 
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1.  Acquire  grants  from  federal  government 
agencies (including NIH and NIMH) 
2.  Use  this  money  to  make  computerized 
versions of the paper-and-pencil survey 
3.  Deploy both versions of the surveys to a half 
dozen clinics around America 
4.  Validate the computerized version against the 
paper-and-pencil version 
5.  Develop two types of reports  
a.  Real-time reports to support clinical 
staff (treatment) 
b.  Aggregate  reports  to  support 
administrators and managers 
 
When I joined the organization in 1998, P-Corp had 
already  completed  steps  1  and  2  and  had  developed 
partnerships  in  support  of  step  3.    My  initial 
responsibility (in 1998) was to help them finalize the 
software and deploy; I then supported steps 4 and 5, 
mainly by debugging and releasing patches.  In 1999, I 
designed  and  implemented  a  new  version,  discussed 
below. 
 
The  initial  software  product  essentially  constituted  a 
quick-and-dirty implementation adequate for validating 
the  chemical  dependency  instruments.  Each  patient 
would sit down and type in his or her name and take a 
survey.    The  computer  would  then  perform  some 
calculations and print out a report to graphically depict 
the  user's  answers,  for  use  by  a  clinician  during 
treatment.  The software offered an export-via-floppy 
feature  so  staff  could  send  data back to P-Corp.  In 
short,  the  initial  version  provided  the  minimal 
necessary  set  of  features  for  acquiring  the  necessary 
data. 
 
However, in its initial form, this software did not offer 
a viable stream of revenue for P-Corp.  It fell short on 
two dimensions, which I addressed in a new version. 
 
First,  the  software  could  only  support  the  chemical 
dependency  suite.    Different  paper-and-pencil 
instruments existed for other patient populations (such 
as  children  with  behavior  problems),  and  P-Corp 
sought  to  perform  steps  1  through  5  of  the  business 
plan for those OM sub-domains, as well.  This implied 
that  many  parts  of  the  system  would  vary:  reports, 
calculations,  surveys,  survey  "due  date"  calculators, 
question  types,  deployment  schemes,  data  export 
methodology, and so forth.  We even needed to section 
off  portions  of  the  aggregate  report  for  presentation 
only in restricted contexts. 
 
The  previous  programmers  had  hard-coded  the 
software for use with one set of inputs and outputs, and 
the  first  dimension  of  my  work  generalized  the 
software  for  use  with  new  inputs  and  outputs.    This 
involved a fairly straightforward “abstract-and-extract” 
process—identify the right level of abstraction, extract 
the  necessary  code,  and  encapsulate  it  behind  an 
interface.  This was relatively easy to accomplish using 
Java  and  Crystal  Reports.    It  occupied  about  three 
months,  plus  time  now  and  then  for  additional 
documentation tasks. 
 
In  contrast,  the  second  dimension  of  the  challenge 
occupied virtually all of my time in 1999 and 2000.  
This  involved  dealing  with  sales,  adoption,  and 
enhancement  problems.    These  ranged  from  adding 
fields  to  reports  to  building  secondary  software 
applications (including a web site) supporting the main 
product.  In many cases, these features had little to do 
with OM itself, but rather with the need to fit OM into 
larger clinical, business, and political contexts.  These 
issues  inspired  this  practicum,  since  they  seemed  to 
surprise  me  at  every  turn  and  led  to  a  great  deal of 
learning.  When I started at P-Corp, I thought I only 
was interested in technical issues.  When I left, I knew I 
needed to think about business issues, as well. 
 
2.3 P-Corp’s programming systems product 
 
After outlining my thoughts above, I realized that these 
two dimensions of software growth at P-Corp closely 
parallel  the  two  dimensions  of  software  growth 
described in "Mythical Man Month" by Brooks [9].  He 
argues  that  a  program  grows  into  a  programming 
systems product first by being generalized for use with 
multiple  inputs,  and  then  by  being  augmented  with 
additional interacting programs which together satisfy 
the overall system goals. 
 
Remarkably,  Brooks  estimates  that  these  dimensions 
demand  roughly  equal  time,  while  I  found  that  the 
second dimension required far more than the first.  Two 
causes  probably  generated  this  difference.    First, 
Brooks  probably  had  plenty  of  people  skilled  in 
business tactics and strategy; in contrast, we had only 
one  (part-time),  and  the  rest  of  us  were  steeped  in 
mathematics, science, or technology.  Second, Brooks 
had  plenty  of  people  who  had  built  at  least  one 
operating system before, whereas we were building the 
first OM software ever—and while our algorithms and 
data  structures  were  straightforward,  the  business 
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business  front,  we  were  less  prepared  than  Brooks' 
team, yet our challenges were great. 
 
2.4 Closing 
 
Although we worked hard to cultivate a market for our 
OM technology, it did not initially take off as quickly 
as we had hoped.  Later, a large insurance organization 
hired P-Corp to produce a browser-based interface to 
some functionality.  Unfortunately, I do not believe that 
the system was ever widely deployed and used, beyond 
an early exploratory installation; the reasons are purely 
business-related,  rather  than  technical,  as  will  be 
discussed below.   
 
As suggested by the discussion above, I had plenty of 
technical successes at P-Corp.  They were not terribly 
educational. 
 
In contrast, my struggles taught me much more.  The 
pith of my experience was this: It's the business that 
bites you.  Let's look at some examples of how, and 
some strategies to succeed. 
 
3. “Distractions” to sales 
 
3.1 Relevant experiences 
 
When we developed our OM systems, we believed that 
they  offered  significant  business  value:    They 
addressed a real need and would be fairly inexpensive.  
Consequently,  we  believed  that,  after  an  initial 
validation  phase  at  each  client  site,  each  customer 
would want to license additional installations at other 
clinics. 
 
However, converting validation sites into sales proved 
somewhat harder than anticipated.  The main cause had 
little  to  do  with  OM:  Customers  were  distracted  by 
other business and regulatory concerns.  The obstacle 
was lack of attention and motivation on the part of our 
anticipated customers.  We needed to overcome these 
issues before we could sell our OM system. 
 
3.1.1 Business example 
As noted earlier, many people work at mental health 
care clinics because of a heartfelt need to help other 
people.    To  achieve  this  end,  they  enter  a  college 
program to study how to counsel, perhaps building on a 
sociology  or  psychology  background.    Then,  some 
enter  private  practice,  while  others  work  for  small 
clinics scattered around the country. 
 
By this description, I mean to emphasize that clinicians 
are  generally  motivated  by  the  heart,  rather  than  the 
wallet.  This mindset pervades the clinics where they 
work, leading to a corporate culture heavily weighted 
toward  hiring  caring  individuals  and  letting  them 
practice their art.  Indeed, many clinics are run from 
top to bottom by former or present clinicians. 
 
What is missing from this culture is a focus on hiring 
hard-nosed  business  executives  ready  to  study  the 
numbers, find a target market, and go after it with the 
fury of a railroad baron.  Consequently, clinics not only 
lack  OM,  but  many  also  lack  software  to  support 
answering basic business issues: 
 
•  How many customers (patients) drop out? 
•  Why do customers leave? 
•  And  who  are  our  customers  any  way 
(marketing demographics)? 
 
Of course, the management knew that these questions 
existed and belonged on the institutional “to-do list.”  
But these questions then had to contend against other 
pressures—such as government regulations and insurer 
contracts—for  a  share  of  the  management’s  time.  
Because the clinics always seemed to be performing the 
organizational equivalent of treading water, these basic 
business questions became urgent issues which never 
received quite enough attention. 
 
Reasonably,  the  management  wanted  to  answer  their 
business  questions  before  spending  time  on  an 
"optional"  system  like  OM.    After  all,  they  believed 
they had talented, caring clinicians who could produce 
adequate outcomes; why invest in a measuring system?  
The main non-clinical goal was to keep in business in 
order to keep serving patients. 
 
As a first step to meet this challenge, we incorporated 
demographic questions into our intake surveys.  This 
allowed us to capture some of the key information that 
management needed for marketing.  For instance, we 
measured gender, race, and education, in addition to a 
handful of more targeted items. 
 
Next, after sites exported their data to us, we combined 
portions  of  the  data  together  to  graph the aggregate.  
(Our contracts ensured that our clinics agreed their data 
could be used, in a non-patient-identifiable fashion, to 
help us enhance our product.  We edited some of the 
actual  numbers  in  the  reports,  as  well,  in  order  to 
further protect the interests of our data collectors.)  We 
showed  these  results  to  the  management  at  clinics, ISRI SE PhD Program Practicum Document, Submitted 3/2/2005 
http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~wls/isri/program_plan.html#practicum 
Page 5 of 26 
evoking  great  excitement  because  we  offered  the 
potential to address long-latent and irksome questions.  
Of  course,  we  also  provided  aggregate  reports  to 
managers  at  the  sites  where  the  data  originated, 
evoking  a  similarly  positive  response  and  references 
which we could use to impress potential customers still 
further. 
 
Moreover, P-Corp tackled the question of patient drop-
out prior to formal discharge, since we viewed drop-out 
as  a  cross-over  from  purely  business  considerations 
into OM territory.  On one hand, some patients drop 
out because they become dissatisfied with the treatment 
provider  and  feel  they  can  get  better  treatment 
elsewhere;  to  a  large  degree,  this  is  based  on 
perception, and is therefore a marketing and business 
issue.    On  the  other  hand,  other  patients  drop  out 
because they truly have healed and do not want to wait 
for discharge, or perhaps because they became much 
worse  and  have  despaired  of  recovery;  for  the  most 
part, this is an OM issue, since the drop-out translates 
into success or failure of treatment.  (It also represented 
a  research  issue,  since  understanding  and  controlling 
non-response error required tracking drop-outs.) 
 
Consequently,  we  took  many  pains  in  our  aggregate 
report  to  highlight  the  rate  at  which  patients  were 
dropping out.  We achieved this by scheduling surveys 
at one-month intervals after intake.  If patients failed to 
take a survey within a couple weeks of being due for a 
survey,  we  assumed  they  had  dropped  out,  and  they 
then showed up on our reports. 
 
This  aggregate  report  feature  helped  clarify  the 
business questions in the managements' minds, and it 
answered some of those questions.  More importantly, 
it helped transition their thoughts from business issues 
to  OM  issues,  which  were  the  real  strength  of  our 
software.   
 
About the time that I left P-Corp, our team had begun 
exploring how to take this strength one step further by 
offering  a  post-treatment  follow-up  (PTF)  survey, 
which  had  already  been  specified  as  part  of  our 
research plan.  The PTF, conducted by phone, would 
ask a targeted or random subset of patients about their 
reason for leaving the program and about their drug or 
alcohol  usage  since  drop-out  or  formal  discharge.  
Preliminary  research  suggested  that  this  data  would 
allow  P-Corp  to  continue  improving  the  power  of 
during-treatment  surveys  to  predict  post-treatment 
events.   
 
Just  as  importantly,  the  PTF  service  would  offer  a 
window into patients' "real lives" outside the walls of 
the  clinic.    What  we  were  doing  was  tying  those 
external experiences to the software we offered for use 
inside the clinic. 
 
Making  that  connection  may  have  been  a  valuable 
strategy for P-Corp.  After all, what the clinicians truly 
cared about was patients' real lives.  What we needed to 
do was help them to see how our software related to 
those concerns. 
 
3.1.2 Regulatory example 
In  1996,  Congress  passed  the  Health  Insurance 
Portability  and  Accountability  Act  (HIPAA)  and  left 
the Department of Health and Human Services (DHS) 
to  write  the  precise  regulations  that  HIPAA  would 
entail.  In response, DHS generated an enormous pile 
of  requirements  that  would  vastly  transform  how 
medical  and  clinical  organizations  managed  patient 
records.  In particular, the HIPAA regulations included 
a  highly-detailed,  cumbersome  set  of  requirements 
concerning the security, transmission, and portability of 
electronic patient records. 
 
Now,  in  terms  of  profits,  most  mental  health  clinics 
operate at or below break-even.  Although the HIPAA 
regulations  were  not  to  take  effect  for  a  couple  of 
years,  it  rapidly  became  clear  that  the  concomitant 
costs  of  meeting  the  regulations  would  be 
unsupportable by the clinics.  This, of course, caused 
their management a great deal of angst.  As a result, 
they  had  little  willingness  to  invest  in  an  "optional" 
solution like OM. 
 
Moreover,  most  mental  health  clinics  operate  with  a 
skeleton  crew  of  technical  personnel.    The  new 
electronic regulations promised to swamp the technical 
staff with numerous hassles that they were unprepared 
to handle: standardization of database formats, addition 
of  new  software  for  purging  the  data  of  certain 
information, and patching or addition of security layers.  
The  technical  management  at  these  organizations, 
caught like a deer in the headlights, strongly resisted 
incurring  the  technical  challenges  of  installing  an 
"optional" system like OM. 
 
In short, although our clients' middle management saw 
the  promise  of  our  products,  they  were  unable  to 
convince  their  upper  management  to  make  the 
necessary  commitments.    This  continued  for  several 
months,  and  I  eventually  realized  (through  meetings 
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problem with a large segment of our customer base.  I 
feel it helped to choke sales, which reduced our ability 
to innovate in new directions (such as fully extending 
our system to the web), and this was the main reason 
why I ultimately left the company in 2000.   
 
Fortunately for P-Corp, days after a new president was 
sworn  in,  the  new  administration  revised  HIPAA's 
regulations  just  before  they  took  full  effect.    The 
revision greatly limited the scale of their impact, which 
took  some  pressure  off  the  clinics;  this  of  course 
allowed  them  to  think  about  investing  in  "optional 
systems" again.    
 
At  the  same  time,  P-Corp  cleverly  turned  the 
challenges into an opportunity by emphasizing features 
which helped clients meet HIPAA's requirements.  For 
example,  the  system  never  transmitted  patient-
identifiable information outside the clinic's walls; this 
feature allowed the clinic to send data to P-Corp for 
aggregate analysis and reporting without any concern 
that patient confidentiality would be violated.  P-Corp 
cleverly  (and  accurately)  advertised  this  feature  as 
being consistent with the security demands of HIPAA. 
The main competitors could not offer a similar feature 
with their existing systems, which were largely based 
on  paper-and-pencil  surveys,  with  patient  names 
written right alongside the data. 
 
Plus,  HIPAA  requires  that  patients  should  have  the 
ability  to  review  their  data  and  flag  it  if  it  contains 
inaccuracies.  We had already begun implementing a 
similar feature, which we exposed through a convenient 
interface  so  that  staff  could  record  any  patient 
complaints.  For very little cost, this feature enabled 
our  electronic  system  to  stand  out  against  the 
competition.  Moreover, soon after I left, P-Corp added 
new security features that made it even easier for the 
organization to meet specific regulation requirements. 
 
Most  importantly,  we  argued  that  OM  would  help 
organizations save money which could then be spent on 
meeting HIPAA requirements.  We supported this with 
existing research showing that treatment has declining 
returns,  and  so  after  an  individual  patient  reaches  a 
certain  point,  it  becomes  less  desirable  to  continue 
delivering  the  same  amount  of  treatment.  
Alternatively,  if  a  patient  struggles  on  one  scale  but 
scores well on others, an OM report could highlight the 
remaining area of weakness so the clinician could focus 
on  it  [17].    Achieving  cost  savings  through  this 
mechanism  hinges  on  putting  a  system  in  place  to 
measure  and  track  outcomes,  so  that  clinics  could 
identify  the  right  point  to  initiate  a  step-down  in 
services. 
 
The story has a happy ending.  In the succeeding years, 
P-Corp has cultivated a wider client base, providing P-
Corp with the revenues necessary to extend the product 
further in scope and features. 
 
3.2 General question 
 
Basic  business  questions  distracted  some  customers.  
Regulatory  issues  distracted  others.    These  instances 
exemplify a more abstract question that appears all too 
often: 
 
"They liked our sales presentation.  How can we get 
them to sign on the dotted line?" 
 
I have seen this question manifest in additional ways: 
 
•  One  clinic  had  a  reorganization  at  the 
executive  level  right  in  the  middle  of 
deploying OM at their main site (and selling it 
for use at secondary sites).  The challenge was 
to  capture  enough  of  the  remaining 
management’s attention that the project could 
keep moving forward. 
•  Another  customer  had  an  existing  contract 
with a hardware vendor for custom handheld 
devices used for collecting surveys.  Any OM 
vendor  seeking  to  do  business  with  this 
customer needed to interface with that front-
end,  in  order  to  live  within  the  customer’s 
existing contractual commitments. 
•  I  am  uncertain  of  the  details,  but  the 
organization for whom we built a partial web-
based  system  seemed  to  be  courting  an 
acquisition  (in  a  failed  attempt  to  avoid 
bankruptcy).  The challenge: How can OM be 
used to improve the corporation’s image and 
acquisition price? 
 
The  basic  issue  is  that  customers  do  not  purchase  a 
product  because  the  vendor  considers  it  valuable.  
Instead,  they  purchase  it  because  they  see  inherent 
benefit  for  dealing  with  the  “whole  problem”  facing 
them.   
 
To a certain extent, this challenge afflicts purveyors of 
products  besides  software.    However,  the  question 
becomes even more difficult in the context of software 
for two reasons. 
 ISRI SE PhD Program Practicum Document, Submitted 3/2/2005 
http://www-2.cs.cmu.edu/~wls/isri/program_plan.html#practicum 
Page 7 of 26 
First,  it  is patently obvious that a steel manufacturer 
needs  to  purchase  coke  or  coal,  as  well  as  iron  and 
other ingredients.  Likewise, an insurance company will 
obviously need to hire labor.  These are obvious inputs 
that are inherently tied to the firm’s output.   
 
In  contrast,  software  is  an  input  that  enables  higher 
efficiencies.    Most  firms  could  be  structured  to 
generate  products  without  using  any  software  at  all.  
Software is an optional input.  What is its relevance to 
the customer’s “whole problem”? 
 
Second,  to  a  large  extent,  software  is  an  intangible 
good.  You can hold coke and coal in your hands, and 
you can shake hands with your labor.  You cannot hold 
logical bits in your hand; with the advent of web-based 
applications, you may not even have a CD. 
 
Consequently,  for  example,  the  steel  manufacturer 
might  not  focus  on  the  fact  that  the  firm  relies  on 
extensive  control  system  software.    Instead,  the 
management  is  more  likely  to  think  about  the 
machinery controlled by that software.  For all practical 
purposes, they perceive the incarnation of the software, 
not the software itself.  Do people even assign the same 
level of “reality” to software (or any virtual information 
good)  as  they  do  to  good  old-fashioned  machinery?  
What, then, is the value of software to the customer’s 
“whole problem”? 
 
3.3 General strategy 
 
Selling software, therefore, involves identifying the real 
problems  afflicting  potential  customers,  and  then 
showing  the  relevance  of  software  to  solving  those 
problems.    In  fact, success requires leveraging those 
problems to make the software even more valuable to 
the customer’s eyes. 
 
One secret to successful business is to turn a challenge 
into  an  opportunity.    P-Corp  achieved  this  by 
capitalizing  on  the  security  requirements  of  HIPAA, 
both  in  terms  of  marketing  existing  features  and 
developing new ones.  It may be that, as in the case of 
HIPAA, the external pressures will dissipate with the 
passage  of  time,  thereby  allowing  your  business  to 
prosper.  However, in the meantime, it makes sense to 
take  advantage  of  those  pressures  to  make  your 
products and services more attractive. 
 
To summarize the pith of this strategy:  Identify and 
leverage the tangential concerns via features to boost 
position.  Achieving this requires two steps. 
 
3.3.1 Understanding the business concerns 
First,  it  is  essential  to  understand  and  to  sympathize 
with the customer’s concerns.  This requires open lines 
of  communication  and  a  willingness  to  view  those 
expressed concerns as an opportunity to understand the 
“whole  problem,”  rather  than  dismissing  them  as 
“distractions.” 
 
This  contrasts  with  a  story  I  recently  heard  about  a 
business  developer  at  one  firm  selling  customized 
software.  He has apparently begun to charge customers 
simply to talk with him on the phone.  Of course, in any 
consulting situation, “the meter” must start some time.  
However, the right time to do this is after the customer 
has had a chance to explain his concerns, and after you 
have  had  an  opportunity  to  discuss  whether  your 
software can help address those concerns.   
 
As noted earlier, demonstrating relevance for software 
is especially hard.  Yet even lawyers (who sometimes 
struggle with a relevance gap of their own) will often 
waive  their  initial consultation fee, precisely because 
they value an opportunity to demonstrate their ability to 
help.    Software  engineering  firms  should  consider 
doing the same. 
 
(An  initial  conversation  will  only  provide  superficial 
coverage  of  the  customer’s  concerns,  and  hence  will 
probably  best  serve  as  a  guide  for  where  to  invest 
further  attention.    It  is  debatable  whether  follow-up 
conversations  about  business  and  regulatory  issues 
should be free.  In the case of P-Corp, where we sold 
products, investigating the customers’ needs was vital 
to developing our product, so there was no discussion 
of actually charging customers to talk.  In a consulting 
scenario, charging for follow-up conversations would 
certainly make more sense.) 
 
Moreover, software development firms would benefit 
from  attempting  to  anticipate  new  business  and 
regulatory trends.  There are two approaches to this, 
both of value: Read and network.  For example, P-Corp 
initially became aware of HIPAA because I read about 
it on the web; we became knowledgeable about it, in 
part,  because  I  attended  a  government-sponsored 
seminar  on  the  subject  and  had  a  chance  to  ask 
questions.  As a company, we invested several man-
hours each week into proactive exploration of this type; 
since  HIPAA  caught  us  off-guard  to  some  degree, 
perhaps  we  should  have  been  spending  more  time.  
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much time to invest in this.  Experimentation seems the 
most obvious and natural route. 
 
3.3.2 Using features to address the concerns 
In addition to the business concerns mentioned above, 
customers  have  a  wide  variety  of  technical  needs.  
Select features to simultaneously address both business 
and technical needs. 
 
For example, if a firm is licensing an OM system, they 
may want one with a back-up/restore capability in case 
of  system  failure.    They  may  have  never  actually 
needed  to  restore  a  software  system  in  the  past,  of 
course,  in  which  case  their  interest  in  this capability 
would be purely hypothetical and somewhat divorced 
from  their  day-to-day  business  concerns.    It  could, 
nonetheless, be a real technical concern. 
 
Yet at the same time, multiple business concerns might 
impinge  on  the  back-up/restore  capability.    For 
example,  perhaps  the  firm  would  like  to  perform 
secondary analyses on the data to support a marketing 
campaign; in this case, the back-up capability could be 
implemented  using  a  comma-separated-values  export, 
to  facilitate  importing  into  Excel.    Alternatively,  the 
firm might be interested in sharing data with another 
organization,  perhaps  to  facilitate  issuing  methadone 
prescriptions;  in  this  case,  an  XML  export  feature 
might  be  more  appropriate.    In  either  scenario,  the 
relevant business concerns drive the feature selection 
so that one feature can help satisfy business concerns as 
well as technical requirements. 
 
In our case, some of our customers were distracted by 
basic business questions.  We addressed those through 
incorporation  of  demographic  items  into  our  intake 
questionnaire and aggregate report, by heavily focusing 
on drop-out in the aggregate report, and by adding on a 
post-treatment-follow-up survey.  At a broad level, we 
needed  to deliver an intake survey any way, and we 
knew  that  an  aggregate  report  was  vital  to  any  OM 
product.    But  the  business  concerns  influenced  the 
specifics of how to implement those features. 
 
Regulatory  issues  distracted  other  customers.    We 
addressed  those  by  heavily  emphasizing  (in  our 
marketing materials) that our system never sent patient-
identifiable information outside the clinic, by providing 
ways for patients to review and annotate their data, and 
by incorporating additional security safeguards.  These 
actions  were  consistent  with  OM  goals  to  collect 
reliable  data,  but  they  represent  a  slightly  higher 
emphasis on privacy and security than OM alone would 
require.  The customers’ business concerns influenced 
our choice of features. 
 
Finally,  when  deciding  whether  to  tackle  a  business 
problem  using  a  feature,  be  sure  to  consider  any 
collateral  costs  that  the  customer  would  incur.    For 
example, if adding a fancy new business intelligence 
reporting  suite  would  require  an  additional  database 
server,  and  the  cost  of  that  server  plus  maintenance 
would exceed the benefit of the report, then think about 
whether  some  feature  package  besides  business 
intelligence might be a better choice.  It makes no sense 
to  introduce  valuable  features  if  doing  so  actually 
reduces the software's net value due to collateral costs.  
Think in terms of total system cost, not just software 
license fees. 
 
In short, each feature should solve multiple parts of the 
whole problem—technical as well as business—in an 
efficient and economical manner.  When I started at P-
Corp as a programmer, I wanted to bury my head in the 
sand  and  simply  focus  on  the  technical  issues.    I 
learned that it is important when selecting features to 
poke my head up and see what other business concerns 
are  nearby.    To  the  extent  that  we  identified  and 
addressed  those  issues,  we  helped  make  our  core 
product more attractive to our customers.  Conversely, 
to the extent that we failed to communicate the benefits 
of  OM  to  prospective  customers,  we  struggled  with 
completing sales. 
 
3.4 Strengths and dangers 
 
The  strategy  essentially  involves  mapping  out  the 
business and technical problems facing your customer, 
and  then  doing  a  static  analysis  (before  building  the 
product)  to  find  an  efficient  set  of  features  to  cover 
those  problems.    This  strategy  has  strengths  to 
recommend it.  However, it can also lead to a number 
of pitfalls. 
 
3.4.1 Strengths 
The  main  strength  of  this  strategy  is  that  software 
features are inherently capable of addressing multiple 
problems  at  once,  as  the  preceding  examples  have 
demonstrated.  In other words, this strategy does not 
ask more of features than is reasonable. 
 
In addition, software features have an especially good 
ability to satisfy requirements in a way that facilitates 
lock-in.  Shapiro and Varian cover this in detail [21].  
The  essence  is  that  software  exhibits  strong  positive 
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software, the more they value it, and the more difficult 
it becomes to move to a competitor’s product.  This 
positive feedback cycle emanates from interoperability 
requirements, investments in training of staff, and so 
forth.  To a certain extent, these issues are present with 
many products, but they are enhanced in the case of 
software by the ease with which software can be copied 
and distributed, thereby shortening the time to reach a 
“critical  mass”  of  installations  when  positive  effects 
become strong. 
 
3.4.2 Dangers 
However, this strategy embodies two dangers, one of 
which  is  that  in  the  giddiness  of  targeting  multiple 
business  problems,  a  feature  is  “stretched”  in  an 
inappropriate  way.    That  is,  a  feature  might  appear 
extremely  attractive  during  a  static  analysis  of  the 
problem  on  paper,  adequately  covering  two  or  even 
more  requirements.    But  in  the  course  of  actually 
implementing  it,  the  requirements  may  dynamically 
turn out to be more nuanced than initially thought.  As 
a result, the feature might not fit the customer’s real 
needs,  with  reduced  utility.    Indeed,  such  “features” 
may even damage the customer’s business. 
 
The other danger is loss of focus.  Successful teams 
have an ability to identify their “core competencies”—
those  things  they  do  better  than  anybody  else—and 
then  to  develop  and  market  from  that  position  of 
strength.  But the strategy I proposed would have firms 
consider  targeting  needs  outside  their  core 
competencies.    How  far  outside  the  core  should  a 
firm’s focus extend (into the region where the firm is 
competing on uphill territory, so to speak)?  How can a 
firm tackle features outside its focus, yet still spend its 
resources inside its focus, without destroying its focus 
in the process? 
 
Each  of  these  two  dangers  constitutes  a  serious 
objection that played out in a variety of ways during 
my  time  at  P-Corp,  and  each  deserves  an  extended 
response.  Indeed, each danger stands on its own quite 
apart  from  whether  a  firm  actually  implements  the 
strategy I am proposing.  That is, all software firms are 
subject to misuse of features as well as loss of focus, 
even  if  they  do  not  follow  the  strategy  prescribed 
above.    Because  of  the  seriousness  of  these  pitfalls, 
Sections 4 and 5 each deal with one of these dangers, 
as well as a corresponding strategy. 
 
4. Adoptability and misuse of features 
 
4.1 Relevant experiences 
 
When features have been implemented in an ungainly 
way,  users  are  less  likely  to  adopt  the  software.  
Sometimes  it  is  hard  to  detect  when  a  feature  has 
failed; other times it is easy to infer that something is 
wrong, based on the frustrated voice emanating from a 
phone.  I have had both experiences. 
 
4.1.1 Failure to account for emotions 
Not all users express their feelings and needs equally 
lucidly.  In some cases, if they dislike your software, 
they  may  attempt  to  undermine  your  product.    This 
does  not necessarily imply any maliciousness, either; 
undermining can happen subconsciously.   
 
We  encountered  this  problem  after  deploying  our 
software  at  several  sites  during  the  validation  phase.  
Clinicians consider themselves to be artists and their 
work  to  be  a  process  requiring  substantial 
customization for each patient.  We might say that they 
believe  chemical  dependency  treatment  is  a  non-
algorithmic process.
1 
 
They  feared  that  when  our  software  printed  reports 
during treatment, that it would attempt to dictate how 
they should treat their patients.  When they heard that 
our system would also produce aggregate reports for 
management, the clinicians’ fears became conflated by 
additional  worries  that  management  would  use  the 
reports to punish ineffective clinicians.   
 
Consequently,  the  clinicians  did  not  encourage  their 
patients to take surveys. 
 
Their perceptions were not entirely misplaced.  In our 
conversations  with  clinics’  management,  we  had 
emphasized the great promise of OM: the opportunity 
to  optimize  treatment  based  on  patient  conditions.  
From a high-level standpoint, this does indeed imply 
modifying  treatment  based  on  survey  and  report 
                                                            
1 This is not unique to mental health care.  Researchers 
have  noted  that  medical  (non-mental  health) 
practitioners  have  long  resisted  clinical  decision 
support software, which are based on expert systems, 
because  they  do  not  trust  that  the  computer  will 
generate correct diagnoses.  To a large extent, this may 
be because these systems typically cannot explain their 
line  of  reasoning  in  a  way  that  the  practitioners 
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information.    Yet  this  does  not  imply  actually  the 
software  must  dictate  how  clinicians  should  perform 
treatment.    Instead,  we  intended  for  our  during-
treatment  reports  to  simply  display  the  available 
information, and let the clinicians decide how to use it.  
(Indeed,  our  scientists  were  not  qualified  to  practice 
chemical dependency counseling, and we might have 
run into legal difficulties if we attempted to incur the 
responsibility of prescribing treatment practices.) 
 
As  for  the  aggregate  reports,  it  is  true  that  the 
management  could  have  used  an  aggregate  reporting 
mechanism  to  identify  poorly  performing  clinicians.  
We  were  collecting  status  at  intake  and  status  at 
discharge;  the  only  step  remaining  would  be  to 
calculate  the  difference  between  these,  tabulated  per 
clinician,  and  then  display  the  result  alongside  each 
clinician’s name.  From an OM standpoint, this might 
even  have  been  beneficial,  since  it  would  help  the 
organization  provide  additional  training  to  clinicians 
with inferior results, or rewards to the rest. 
 
Several  months  after  deployment,  we  realized  that 
fewer  patients  were  taking  surveys  than  anticipated.  
Fortunately, our company leaders had maintained good 
lines  of  communication  through  weekly  conference 
calls, which they used to inspire middle management to 
look  into  the  situation.    They  reported back that the 
clinicians were fearful about the during-treatment and 
aggregate reports.  In response, we took several steps. 
 
For  the  during-treatment  reports,  we  changed  some 
formatting and added some text to emphasize that the 
data simply were provided as a tool, not as a means to 
dictate  the  treatment  process.    We  modified  our 
marketing literature and training materials, as well, to 
prevent a repeat in the future. 
 
In addition, we enhanced the intake survey and report 
so that it would save clinicians time.  Specifically, upon 
intake,  most  clinics  require  the  clinicians  to  fill  out 
several  forms.    We  could  ask  some  of  the  relevant 
questions  and  automatically  print  out  the  requisite 
form, thereby saving the clinician 15 to 30 minutes per 
intake  patient.    This  allowed  the  clinician  to  spend 
more time actually counseling the patient, rather than 
doing  paperwork.    That  is,  we  were  adapting  an 
existing  feature  (collecting  surveys  and  delivering 
reports)  to  solve  an  additional  business  problem 
discovered later in the process.  In essence, we were 
putting  the  strategy  of  Section  3  into  effect  in  a 
dynamic fashion, building on features as new problems 
appeared. 
 
With  respect  to  aggregate  reports,  we  shelved  any 
nascent plans for a per-clinician breakdown of reports 
and instead focused on the demographic and drop-out 
aspects  examined  in  the  previous  section.    We  also 
helped  prepare  paper  presentation  materials  that  the 
management used to actually show clinicians what the 
reports contained.  This allayed their fears and in some 
cases  even  excited  clinicians  when  they  saw  the 
software  indicated  that,  on  net,  their  patients  were 
indeed improving.  That is, our software boosted their 
sense  of  accomplishment  and  helped  to  get  them  on 
board from an emotional standpoint. 
 
Note  that  these  changes  largely  occurred  well  into 
development and deployment.  As a former co-worker 
expressed, “In retrospect, we never asked clinics what 
they needed.  Instead we had a solution and tried to 
convince them that they had a problem.”  Incorporating 
the “voice of the customer” earlier in the development 
process  might  have  forestalled  some  of  these 
challenges. 
 
Nonetheless, as a result of these changes, we had much 
less trouble with clinicians failing to encourage their 
patients to adopt the software. 
 
4.1.2 Failure to account for constraints 
In  addition  to  clinicians  and  management,  clinics 
include  a  variety  of  staff  that  perform  clerical  tasks.  
We failed to address their “whole problem,” too. 
 
Our system, unlike some competitors’, was based on 
such reliable survey instruments that we felt we could 
accurately measure patients’ well-being using only one 
survey per month.  As a result of this feature, patients 
each spend less time at the computer during the course 
of treatment, meaning that clinics incur less collateral 
cost  in  computers  to  serve  a  patient  population  of  a 
given  size.    Moreover,  because  patients  answer  the 
survey  less  often,  they  are  probably  less  likely  to 
become  bored  with  it  and  may  be  more  likely  to 
provide  reliable  answers.    So  this  wonderful  feature 
potentially  held  both  business  benefits  (lower 
equipment costs) and technical benefits (higher quality 
data). 
 
Unfortunately,  we  ran  into  some  trouble  actually 
putting this scheme into practice.  Specifically, when a 
patient arrives at a clinic for the next session, he walks 
to a receptionist counter, where a staff person tells the 
patient whether or not to take a survey (and also asks 
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administrative tasks).  The problem is, if a patient does 
not  need  to  take  a  survey  every  visit,  how  does  the 
receptionist  know  whether  a  survey  is  “due”  at  the 
current visit? 
 
We  wanted  to  keep  our  system  on  a  completely 
separate  LAN,  in  order  to  improve  the  system’s 
security.  Physical security was particularly important, 
since  none  of  the  data  were  encrypted  at  that  time.  
Consequently, we could not install a query tool on the 
receptionist’s  desktop  computer  to  help  determine 
whether the patient was due for a survey. 
 
Our initial response was to provide a printout that the 
receptionist could generate at the beginning of the day.  
This printout would list all the patients who were due 
for a survey on that day, and when a patient walked 
through the door, the receptionist could conveniently 
determine whether to direct the patient to take a survey. 
 
Unfortunately,  although  this  worked  fine  for  smaller 
clinics,  printouts  became  dozens  of  pages  long  for 
larger  clinics.    Moreover,  the  initial  quick-and-dirty 
version  stored  each  patient’s  name  in  a  single  field 
(rather  than  separate  first  and  last  name  fields),  and 
staff entered some names as “John Doe” but entered 
others as “Doe, John.”  In other words, alphabetizing 
the  list  provided  little  help  in navigating the lengthy 
printout  to  locate  each  patient’s  name.    (Plus,  not 
finding  the  name  could  mean  two  things:  Either  the 
patient  is  not  due,  or  the  name  was  not  typed  as 
anticipated!)  Consequently, the receptionists found this 
extra  work  immensely  burdensome  and  had  little 
interest in adopting the software. 
 
We then proposed to put another desktop computer on 
the receptionist’s desk.  This computer, connected to 
our own LAN, would have provided access to a query 
tool where the staff member could type in the patient's 
name.   
 
Unfortunately,  each  receptionist’s  desk  generally  had 
inadequate  space  for  an  additional  computer.  
Fortunately we asked a couple clinic managers about 
physical  constraints  before  actually  trying  to  roll-out 
the query tool to the sites. 
 
The last approach I was involved in took the form of a 
card swipe system.  Each patient generally received an 
identification  card  (with  a  magnetic  strip)  from  the 
insurance company prior to intake.  We proposed to put 
a  card  reader  on  the  receptionist's  desk,  and  run  an 
extra long cord to a computer stowed off to the side.  If 
a  "due"  patient  swiped  his  card,  then  the  computer 
would emit a loud gong sound; otherwise, it would emit 
a chime for "not due" or the sound of breaking glass for 
"cannot read card."  The clinic management involved 
reviewed this plan and improved it, then sent us some 
sample  cards  so  we  could  experiment.    We 
implemented the system, tested it, and rolled it out. 
 
Unfortunately, many patients forget their cards.  In fact, 
it was possible for a patient to lack a card completely, 
if the insurance company had failed to send it prior to 
his appointment.  While the staff were fairly amused by 
the  software’s  sounds,  they  still  became  annoyed 
because they lacked a convenient way to ensure that 
exactly the right patients took a survey. 
 
Once again, we were left with no perfect way to take 
advantage of the feature that sent us down this road.  
All told, we probably spent several hundred man-hours 
of  programming  and  frustrated  phone  calls  on  this 
problem, with less to show for it than we had hoped.  
Worse,  coping  with  these  workflow  and  physical 
constraints  cost  us  weeks  that  the  competition  could 
use to refine their own systems.  While we should have 
been  consolidating  our  position  by  constructing 
positive network effects, instead our competition stood 
to gain on us.  To this day, I have no idea how P-Corp 
ultimately solved this interface issue. 
 
4.2 General question 
 
These struggles fall under the general heading of: 
 
"They refuse to use the software.  What do I do?" 
 
These  examples  have  highlighted  the  fact  that 
designers'  failure  to  anticipate  emotions,  constraints, 
and workflow issues can interfere with adoption.  There 
are  other  sources  of  frustration,  of  course,  such  as 
inadequate training or outright bugs.  However, most 
user frustration that I observed at P-Corp resulted from 
our failure to anticipate, and this played out in other 
situations, as well: 
 
•  We  successfully  deployed  at  several  smaller 
clinics,  each  requiring  a  single  desktop 
system.    At  the  first  large  clinic  requiring 
multiple  computers,  we simply assumed that 
we  could  install  multiple  machines.    But  it 
turned out that this clinic wanted extra privacy 
for the patients taking the survey and desired 
carrel  desks  for  the  computers  to  rest  on.  
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make space!  As a result, we incurred a delay 
before that deployment could occur. 
•  We wanted to export data via floppy disk once 
per  month.    Unfortunately,  there  was  no 
convenient "spot" in the natural workflow that 
would  automatically  remind  the  staff  to 
perform the export; so they forgot, and we did 
not  get  data  in  a  timely  fashion.    (This 
changed  after  the  first  aggregate  reports, 
which excited the management and clinicians 
enough that they reminded the staff to export 
the data regularly.) 
 
In  these  situations  and  others,  we  discovered  new 
"adoption-stopper"  details  after  roll  out,  and  these 
surprises  interfered  with  our  ability  to  meet  our 
customers'  needs.    Some  designers  might  argue  that 
these were new requirements, while others might argue 
that  they  were  merely  refinements  of  existing 
requirements.  Either way, we were discovering along 
the  way  that  the  customers'  problems  were  not  as 
simple  as  they  first  seemed,  and  that  our  feature 
packages did not cover those needs as well as we had 
hoped. 
 
As with the "tangential distractions" issue in Section 3, 
this  challenge  affects non-software products, as well.  
However, the complexity and specialization of software 
exacerbates  the  challenge  for  our  domain  of 
engineering. 
 
When a shopper goes to Home Depot and purchases a 
hammer for installing sheetrock and remodeling, she is 
unlikely to find that the hammer will not fit into her 
workflow.  She simply looks at the hammer, decides if 
it feels heavy enough to do the job, and if it has a head 
that looks suitable for sheetrock nails.  And, like most 
simple  and  unspecialized  tools  designed  to  support 
simple jobs, hammers work reasonably well even if the 
owner fails to pick precisely the right one for the job at 
hand.  Adoption of simple tools for simple jobs is a 
simple process. 
 
In contrast, purchasers and purveyors of software often 
speak  radically  different  languages.    Customers  may 
lack a clear understanding of what they want to buy, 
and even in the best case may struggle to explain those 
the  complexities  of  their  work  in  a  way  that  the 
software  engineer  understands.    Consequently,  the 
customer may express certain needs, and the engineer 
may  think  he  understands  then  goes  off  to  design  a 
system that turns out to solve the wrong problem.  (In 
one  worst  case  scenario,  the  customer  might  believe 
that  the  engineers  reneged  on  a  contract and issue a 
lawsuit.) 
 
This  challenge  was  particularly  difficult  in  our  case, 
since  we  were  building  the  first  computerized  OM 
system ever.  Unlike a hammer, which everybody has 
seen and held, nobody yet knew what an OM system 
should  “look  like.”    Consequently,  completely 
specifying its functionality in advance was especially 
impossible. 
 
How  is  this  different  from  civil  or  aeronautical 
engineering?    After  all,  those  disciplines  and  many 
others are rife with the same problem. 
 
The  exacerbation  is  that  customers  think  software  is 
soft.  They often cannot understand why redesigning, 
retesting, and redeploying software takes so long.  Yet 
according  to  some  estimates,  implementing  a  large 
operating system and supporting applications can cost 
roughly as much as all the research and development 
costs  of  the  Manhattan  Project  combined…  and,  of 
course, changing the software system’s design can be 
commensurately difficult.
2   
 
I  would  wager  that  when  most  customers  view  a 
finished sewage treatment plant or nuclear bomb, they 
are unlikely to think that a significant redesign could be 
completed by the civil or nuclear engineers in a very 
short  time.    (They  may  still  require  changes  before 
drinking treated water from the sewage treatment plant 
or dropping the nuclear bomb, but at least they might 
have  more  reasonable  expectations  about  the  cost  of 
changes.)  Yet they think little of demanding sweeping 
requirements changes for software in a short timeframe.  
Software is perceived to be softer than it usually is. 
 
4.3 General strategy 
 
In a sense, Section 3 assumed that you could lay all the 
business and technical needs out on a table and then 
cover them with features through a static analysis.  In 
this section, the problem has become a dynamic one: 
new  adoption-stopper  requirements  appear  after  you 
have designed the feature cover. 
 
                                                            
2 One team of engineers used COCOMO to estimate 
that Debian 2.2 would have cost nearly $1.8B to build 
by proprietary means (in year 2000 currency) [14]. The 
Brookings  Institution  estimated  that  R&D  for  the 
Manhattan  Project  cost  less  than  $800M  (in  2006 
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Hence,  one  strategy  for  dealing  with  the  current 
problem  is  to  reduce  it  to  the  previous  problem: 
anticipate needs and turn the dynamic problem into a 
static problem.  Of course, a few new needs will still 
appear nonetheless, and the main coping strategy that 
worked  in  P-Corp  was  to  incorporate  changes  in  a 
modular fashion as much as possible.   
 
4.3.1 Anticipate needs 
The best way to anticipate needs is to take time to study 
your customer.  There are many ways to do this, but the 
one which resonated with me was Contextual Design 
(designed by Holtzblatt and Beyer), which we studied 
in ISRI's "Methods" course (17-752) [6].  Ever since 
working at P-Corp, I have intuited that engineers need 
to really understand the context where software will be 
used, and I am glad to have learned about Contextual 
Design,  since  it  would  have  prevented  many  of  the 
surprises described above: 
 
•  We stumbled over the fact that clinicians felt 
they  were  "artists,"  which  should  have 
appeared  on  a  cultural  model  of  the 
organizations. 
•  We incorporated customized intake printouts 
into  our  system  to  reduce  the  paperwork 
burden on clinicians.  The extant forms that 
we obviated would have generated an artifact 
model. 
•  We  failed  to  appreciate  how  many  records 
would appear on the list of patients "due" for a 
survey.  A sequence or workflow model might 
have uncovered this surprise. 
•  We  wanted  to  install  an  extra  computer  on 
receptionist  desks  that  lacked  space,  an 
obvious constraint that would have appeared 
on a physical model. 
•  We did not realize that patients often lacked 
their  identification  cards.    In  fact,  even  the 
management who approved our plan did not 
realize this.  But it would have appeared on a 
workflow or sequence model. 
 
We  designed  software  for  a  context  that  we  never 
thoroughly explored.  By the time we arrived to install 
the system, it was too late to make changes, and even 
then, our focus was on training rather than studying the 
users.    Consequently,  we  ended  up  discovering 
surprises.   
 
Investing  in  Contextual  Design,  or  a  suitable  on-site 
substitute,  would  have  saved  everyone  a  substantial 
amount of frustration. 
 
Incidentally, we attempted to stave off some surprises 
by hiring a former clinician as a consultant.  She did 
provide  some  general  insights,  but  apparently  not 
enough.  We also asked our customer representatives 
about their sites, but they often lacked enough detailed 
knowledge  to  prevent  design  errors  (as  with  the 
identification card issue above). 
 
There  seems  to  be  no  substitute  for  actually  getting 
engineers on-site so they can ask questions and explore 
with their own senses.  Retrospective accounts (even by 
well-paid consultants) often lack the nuances necessary 
for  implementing  features  in  a  way  that  optimizes 
adoptability. 
 
Later,  during  implementation,  be  sure  to  provide 
prototypes  to  the  customer  for  further  usability 
evaluation.    As  suggested  by  Holtzblatt  and  Beyer, 
these  prototypes  should  also  be  tested  on-site  as  if 
being  used  like  a  real  system  to  address  needs  in 
context.    (We  sent  copies  of  our  proposed  during-
treatment  reports  to  clinic  representatives  and  to  our 
consultant, but no one expressed any concern that the 
reports  appeared  to  dictate  treatment  practices  to 
clinicians.  Perhaps “using” the reports in situ would 
have helped.)   
 
Brooks has argued that engineers should “plan to throw 
one away,” [9] meaning that the first design is almost 
guaranteed  to  need  significant  reworking  after  the 
customer gives initial feedback.  If this is the case, why 
not  make  the  first  system  out  of  paper  (as  much  as 
possible)?    Then,  after  implementing  the  system  for 
real, test it some more in an alpha or beta form to iron 
out any final adoptability issues. 
 
If  you  perform  these  steps  prior  to  final 
implementation,  you  will  probably  encounter  fewer 
nasty surprises later on.  The reason is that by studying 
the users' work, you have a chance to understand their 
needs.  That way, you can turn the frustrating process 
of dynamically discovering surprise requirements along 
the way into a cleaner picture supporting an up-front 
static analysis. 
 
Section 3 argued for addressing business problems (in 
addition to technical problems) as a way of increasing 
software's value to the company.  But by studying the 
needs of users themselves, you can increase software's 
value to the users.  The first is important for selling the 
software; the second is essential for ensuring adoption. 
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4.3.2 Coping with change 
Of course, even a careful Contextual Design will not 
produce  change-proof  software.    Hence,  your 
organization  will  need  to  cope  with  at  least  some 
modifications.  In fact, even if you perfectly anticipated 
your current customers' needs, you might still need to 
incorporate significant later changes in order to capture 
additional shares of the market.  (Try doing that with a 
sewage treatment plant or a nuclear bomb.) 
 
As noted in Section 2, one of my main responsibilities 
at P-Corp was to design a new version of the software 
with  a  much  higher  level  of  modularity—identifying 
the right level of abstraction for portions of the code 
that  needed  to  vary, extracting the code into distinct 
chunks,  and  hiding  that  code  behind  interfaces  so  it 
could  easily  be  swapped  for  an  alternate 
implementation  satisfying  the  same  interface.    For 
example,  I  abstracted  the  reports,  "date  due" 
calculators,  and  aggregate  report  subsections  behind 
various interfaces. 
 
This additional abstraction turned out to be the key to 
successfully coping with change.  For example, I was 
able  to  implement  custom  intake  forms  (to  save 
clinicians time) as just another report.  Moreover, the 
platform (Java and Crystal Reports) was well-suited to 
modular design. 
 
Using this approach, I was able to excise old modules 
in minutes, such as the plain vanilla intake report, and 
link in the custom replacement (which took somewhat 
longer to implement due to its length).  This saved a 
great deal of integration testing and debugging time, as 
well.  Even the patch builder treated these modules as a 
directory full of black boxes, which saved time during 
roll-out.  As a result, once we understood the problem 
we  were  up  against,  we  were  able  to  address  it 
efficiently. 
 
Of course, other authors have already argued the merits 
of  modularization  more  forcefully  than  this.    For 
example, Booch takes it as a matter of course that all 
good systems are modularly designed: "It is essential to 
preserve the architectural integrity of a system.  That 
goal is generally achieved by building architectures that 
are  constructed  in layers of abstraction, have a clear 
separation  of  concerns  among  these  layers,  and  are 
simple" [8]. 
 
Even though none of my courses had ever taught me 
how  to  do  modular  design,  I  still  had  learned  those 
technical  lessons  on  my  own  prior  to  arriving  at  P-
Corp.  What I learned at P-Corp is the non-technical 
rationale  why  modular  design  is  so  important: it lets 
you  react  to  new  customer  needs  in  a  very  efficient 
manner. 
 
Then,  as  time  progresses,  when  a  new  requirement 
appears and prompts a design change, try to implement 
the  requirement  in  a  way  that  maintains  a  modular 
design.    The  reason  is  that  the  design  which  results 
from the first requirements change will be the design 
you  start  with  when  the  second  requirements  change 
comes along.  And so forth.   
 
At any moment in time, there may be a temptation to 
gut the design and just hack in a new feature to get a 
requirement  out  of  the  way.    However,  doing  so 
compromises your software's ability to adapt to future 
changes.  Those changes will be essential to continuing 
to  improve  the  adoptability  of  your  software,  so  a 
modular design will retain substantial value throughout 
the software's lifetime. 
 
4.4 Strengths and dangers 
 
4.4.1 Strengths 
The  main  strength  of  this  strategy  is  that  techniques 
exist to support it. 
 
The  strategy's  first  prong  is  to  study  the  users  in 
context.    Contextual  Design  is  the  most  applicable 
technique that I know of, though I did apply use case 
analysis (relying on [7]) with some success on a side 
project late in my time at P-Corp.  Older techniques 
seem to exist, as well, but appear to be less context-
oriented  than  Contextual  Design  and  even  more 
functional-decomposition-oriented  than  use  case 
analysis. 
 
The strategy's second prong is to create and protect a 
modular design as much as possible.  A wide variety of 
frameworks already exist to support modular designs at 
a  high  level,  and  writers  have  documented  many 
patterns for guiding modular designs at a lower level. 
 
4.4.2 Dangers 
The hardest part about this strategy is not in learning it.  
After all, I intuited the need for in-context design, and I 
learned  how  to  do  modular  design  without  the 
assistance of any courses.  (Many other programmers 
have done likewise.) 
 
Instead, the main challenge of this strategy is in finding 
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that an organization will succumb to the pressures of 
the moment and throw aside these techniques.  Dealing 
with  this  pitfall  requires  getting  your  own 
management's support for budgeting plenty of schedule 
and  resources  to  follow  the  plan;  having  stories  on 
hand (like mine at P-Corp) may help make the case that 
this  schedule  and  resource  investment  is  insurance 
against surprises. 
 
Perhaps  a  second  danger  within  this  strategy  is  the 
potential  for  overly  focusing  on  a  single  user  who 
refuses to adopt the software for purely idiosyncratic 
reasons.    This  argues  for  making  sure  that  you 
interview a wide breadth of users within a certain role 
in  order  to  provide  a  balanced  view  of  those  users' 
needs.    Likewise,  be  sure  to  study  a  wide  range  of 
stakeholders (such as patients, clinicians, management, 
and staff) to ensure that you account for all their needs, 
rather than neglecting some while over-optimizing for 
others.  In particular, be sure to target users who are 
strategically  placed  to  either  hamper  or  facilitate  the 
adoption of your software. 
 
Finally, this strategy encourages developers to seek the 
users' input, which (given enough users) may ultimately 
lead to irreconcilable demands.  One way to avoid this 
is to keep the discussion focused on needs rather than 
features.  That way, the features remain free variables 
under  your  control,  and  you  can  use  them  (per  the 
strategy of Section 3) to address multiple parts of the 
whole problem simultaneously. 
 
For  example,  staff  might  prefer  that  patients  should 
take  a  survey  after  counseling  sessions,  whereas 
clinicians  might  prefer  that  patients  should  take  a 
survey before counseling.  Why get into an argument 
about when the survey feature’s timing?  Instead, focus 
on the needs driving those stakeholder demands… 
 
Delving  further  might  reveal,  for  instance,  that 
appointments start in waves (say, on the half hour), and 
staff are too busy prior to the appointments with co-
pays that they cannot spare time to direct patients to 
take surveys; but they may have time as patients trickle 
out near the end of their appointments.  On the other 
hands, clinicians might want a fresh survey, along with 
its corresponding report, for use during the counseling 
session.   
 
Stated this way, in the form of needs rather than feature 
demands, leaves open a wide variety of solutions.  For 
instance,  the  software  might  be  structured  so  that 
patients  can  sit  down  at  the  computer  prior  to 
counseling and identify themselves (without any help 
from the staff), thus letting the computer tell the patient 
directly whether he is due for a survey.  This would 
raise the collateral costs in terms of hardware (a major 
reason  we  did  not  push  this  approach),  but  it would 
satisfy the two stakeholders of this example. 
 
In closing, keep in mind that the users want to succeed 
at  their  work.    They  are  generally  willing  to  adopt 
software  if  it  makes  a  demonstrable  contribution 
toward achieving that work.  Whereas sales depend on 
convincing the higher-ups that the system benefits the 
corporation, adoption depends on convincing the users 
that they will benefit from the system.   
 
5. Enhancement and loss of focus 
 
5.1 Relevant experiences 
 
Although  government  grants  carried  P-Corp  through 
the early validation and development stages, they did 
not  contain  significant  money  for  marketing  or  later 
enhancements.    Consequently,  there  was  a  period  of 
time  after  validation  but  before  sales  exceeded 
expenses  when  we  lacked  resources  for  significantly 
enhancing the application.   
 
Even  prosperous  firms  might  struggle  with  a  similar 
challenge  if  pursuing  certain  enhancements  would 
result in a loss of focus.  The preceding sections have 
argued  for  using  features  to  cover  technical  and 
business  needs,  both  up-front  and  after  roll-out,  in 
order to improve sales and adoption.  But as Section 3 
pointed out, one danger is that this will result in a loss 
of focus.  Consequently, a firm might observe that its 
system should provide a certain enhancement, but that 
providing this enhancement would lead far away from 
their core competencies. 
 
If the company has few resources—or if resources exist 
but  cannot  be  allocated—then  continually  enhancing 
the system becomes a serious challenge.  In situations 
like these, it makes sense to find alternative routes to 
enhancing the desirability of the system.   
 
5.1.1 Enhancement thru information sharing 
Since  systems  consist  of  hardware  and  service,  in 
addition to software, not all useful features come in the 
form  of  software.    Examples  include  support, 
documentation, and training.  Of course, these relate to 
the software, but the software does not literally embody 
these  features.    P-Corp’s  customers  generally  lacked 
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software features; however, they were quite capable of 
helping us enhance non-software features. 
 
For  example,  one  clinic  often  organized  internal 
research studies.  We provided access to a subset of the 
data collected at their site, which they used to perform 
a variety of analyses (for use in internal memos).  They 
shared  some  results  with  us,  which  had two positive 
effects.  One was the direct benefit of being able to use 
those  results  to  guide  improvements  in  the  product.  
The  other  benefit  was  additional  insight  into  what 
questions this clinic considered interesting, provoking 
additional  research  ideas  among  the  scientists  in  our 
corporation.  The “sneak peek” into clinics’ goals was 
valuable  for  guiding  research  objectives,  journal  and 
conference articles, and future grant applications. 
 
As another example, for two larger clinics owned by 
the one large organization, we added extra questions to 
some surveys and included the results in the aggregate 
reports.  (These items were like the demographic data 
mentioned earlier but dealt with more sensitive issues.)  
These activities took us a small amount of time, but our 
contacts  at  the  client  organization  significantly 
magnified our efforts by sharing the report with many 
people.  This greatly raised the visibility of our system 
at the highest levels of the organization, which led to 
negotiations  for  installing  our  system  at  additional 
sites.  By giving them information they could share, our 
customer essentially did much of our selling for us. 
 
5.1.2 Enhancement thru weight of data 
Perhaps the biggest way that our customers helped us 
was by exporting their data every month.  In doing so, 
they  helped  themselves  (since  we  could  send  them 
aggregate  reports  in  response)  and  this  served  as 
powerful motivation.  We also benefited as well… 
 
The success of OM hinges on being able to accurately 
determine  whether  patients  are  “well.”    However, 
“well” is a relative term, always to be considered with 
respect to an underlying population. 
 
In the case of P-Corp’s first OM system, the underlying 
population  was  the  set  of  all  chemical  dependency 
patients.    To  achieve  this,  we  asked  each  patient  a 
variety of questions, created a linear combination from 
the  responses,  and  then  scaled  the  result  against 
answers  from  other  patients  in  the  same  population.  
This allowed us to indicate that a given patient’s score 
ranked in a certain percentile. 
 
There are four issues with this.  The most obvious is 
validity:  do  those  questions  actually  measure  if  the 
patient is “well”?  The second usual issue to address is 
reliability: do patients each give the same answers if 
asked  multiple  times?    These  common  issues  were 
addressed by the early research leading to the creation 
of standardized scales.  (Not all our competitors used 
equally reliable scales; we had negotiated an agreement 
to  use  the  “gold  standards”  of  the  industry  from  the 
scales’ original developers.) 
 
The third issue is more subtle and deals with sampling.  
Our  normative  base  consisted  of  a  sample  of  the 
underlying  population;  researchers  never  asked  these 
questions  of  every  chemical  dependency  patient,  but 
only  a  few  hundred.    Thus,  our  picture  of  the 
underlying  population  was  subject  to  sampling error.  
Put  visually,  converting  a  histogram  of  our  patients’ 
scores  into  a  probability  distribution  curve  would 
require  drawing  error  bars  around  each  point  on  the 
curve.    This  limited  our  ability  to  precisely  pinpoint 
how  “well”  a  given  patient  was,  simply  because  our 
view  of  the  underlying  population  was  somewhat 
“blurred” by sampling error.  
 
Finally,  the  most  robust  way  to  assess  relative 
“wellness” would be to compare to a sub-population of 
chemical dependency patients.  Not all substances are 
equally addictive, and for some purposes it might make 
sense to break the population into smaller groups.  For 
example,  a  recovering  heroin  addict  might  still  be 
having  a  great  deal  of  financial  trouble  (and  score 
poorly on the “financial” suite of questions relative to 
all  chemical  dependency  patients),  but  he  might  be 
doing extremely well for a heroin patient.  This might 
have  implications  for  the  treatment  recommended 
through OM.   
 
Unfortunately,  with  only a few hundred cases in our 
sample  set,  we  were  lucky  to  be  able  to  compare 
patients  to  the  entire  chemical  dependency  patient 
population,  let  alone  to  sub-populations.    Collecting 
more data was the key to improving our precision and 
also the key to diversifying our normative base over 
various sub-populations. 
 
Once sites began to export data on a reliable schedule, 
our database grew rapidly to several thousand records.  
In our second version, we were able to claim several 
times  as  much  precision  for  our  estimates  of  how 
“well” patients were doing.  By now, I suspect that P-
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probably yielding the largest chemical dependency OM 
database ever. 
 
Of course, this data not only helped directly enhance 
the chemical dependency product, but also facilitated 
seeking additional grants.  Since P-Corp’s initial foray 
into  chemical  dependency,  they  have  won  funds  to 
computerize scales for depression, anxiety, components 
of  mental  health,  attention  deficit  disorder,  and  a 
variety  of  issues  specific  to  youths.    Much  of  this 
became  possible  because  our  customers  dutifully 
collected data and sent it back to us. 
 
5.2 General question 
 
The  question  is,  "My  firm  cannot  allocate  more 
resources.    How  can  I  enhance  the  software?”  
Instances of this challenge occurred several times at P-
Corp: 
 
•  For  example,  we  had  money  to  create  a 
browser-based  survey  front-end  (which  we 
sold  to  one  customer),  but  the  aggregate 
reports were never ported to a browser-based 
interface.  In fact, I seem to remember always 
delivering  our  aggregate  reports  in  print 
format!    Consequently,  our  customers  were 
unable  to  easily  distribute  copies 
electronically to advertise our work.  Around 
the  time  I  left,  P-Corp  had  begun 
experimenting  with  adding  a  web-based 
aggregate report feature. 
•  We also lacked the manpower and expertise 
for addressing certain support issues (such as 
how  to  use  OM  at  a  basic  clinical  level  to 
guide  treatment).    We  discussed  the  idea  of 
setting  up  an  online  community  where  end 
users  could  communicate  with  one  another 
and  provide  mutual  support,  though  this 
initiative was still embryonic when I left. 
•  At one point after we built the browser-based 
survey front-end, I urged our CEO to market it 
as  a  general-purpose  tool  (for  use  by 
marketers, academics, and other users outside 
the  clinical  domain).    This  would  have 
allowed us to target additional business.  He 
wisely advised that what we did best was the 
material inside the system, and not the survey 
software itself.  He was right not to allocate 
resources for this initiative: since then, a wide 
variety  of  survey  systems  have  arisen, 
including some that are nearly free.  P-Corp 
continues  to  compete  on  the  basis  of  OM 
content, and they are succeeding.
3 
 
The question of how and when to enhance a system can 
be broken into three parts. 
 
The first is, “Does this feature deserve to be built in the 
first place?”  Sections 3 and 4 address this question (in 
the  contexts  before  and  after  roll-out,  respectively).  
Assuming  the  feature  passes  muster,  two  additional 
sub-questions remain. 
 
The next sub-question is, “Is this a feature that deserves 
a  significant  allocation  of  resources?”    Accurately 
answering this demands focusing on the things that you 
do better than other firms.   
 
And if the feature does not legitimately fall within your 
focus,  then  the  final  sub-question  becomes  relevant: 
“Can  customers  or  partners  be  motivated  to  produce 
this feature?” 
 
5.3 General strategy 
 
Meeting this challenge involves addressing the last two 
sub-questions. 
 
5.3.1 Allocating resources according to focus 
Deciding whether to invest your own resources into a 
feature  requires  a  framework  for  reasoning.    This 
framework has two parts: a vision, and a plan. 
 
The vision specifies a relatively static reason for the 
company’s existence.  Drucker writes, “That business 
purpose  and  business  mission  are  so  rarely  given 
adequate thought is perhaps the single most important 
cause of business frustration and business failure” [13]. 
 
A  vision  is  different  from  the  all-things-to-all-people 
nebulousness which passes for a mission statement at 
many organizations.  Instead, it is a focused statement 
of what the company has to offer its clients.  Drucker 
continues, “There is only one such focus, one starting 
point.    It  is  the  customer…  All  the  customer  is 
                                                            
3  Interestingly,  in  the  past  few  years,  a  number  of 
companies  such  as  Survey  Monkey 
(surveymonkey.com) have successfully struck out and 
implemented  profitable  general-purpose  web  survey 
systems.  Ideally, P-Corp would have had the capital to 
spin  off  a  subsidiary  that  could  develop  and  license 
back a profitable survey system.  Unfortunately, such 
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interested  in  are  his  or  her  own  values,  wants,  and 
reality.  For this reason alone, any serious attempt to 
state  ‘what  our  business  is’  must  start  with  the 
customer’s  realities,  his  situation,  his  behavior,  his 
expectations, and his values” [13]. 
 
Defining  a  focus,  then,  involves  understanding  the 
customer’s  needs  and  your  own strengths.  They are 
both crucial.  Find the intersection and set up camp.   
 
To  a  certain  extent,  P-Corp  failed  to  actuate  this 
strategy,  since  we  picked  a  solution  (OM)  and  then 
tried to convince customers of its utility.  Our vision 
was to help clinical organizations use OM to improve 
effectiveness of treatment.  Achieving this over a wide 
range  of  clinical  populations  would  revolutionize 
mental  health  care.    Yet  this  grand  goal  is  suitable 
because  it  represents  the  intersection  of  serious 
customer needs with deep knowledge and experience 
among  the  P-Corp  scientists.    As  it  turned  out,  the 
vision  was  worthwhile,  but  it  might  have  benefited 
from additional interaction with prospective customers 
prior to setting the company’s strategic direction. 
 
Even after your firm has a vision, you still need a plan.  
The  plan  describes  how  to  achieve  that  vision  by 
putting your strengths into action in order to meet the 
customer’s needs.  Designing such a plan, and using it 
to allocate resources, may require working closely with 
other people who have substantial business experience 
and talent. 
 
Virtually all of the foregoing applies equally to non-
software firms, yet that last point often seems to be lost 
on technical people.  We seem to believe that we can 
survive  and  thrive  without  help  from  “the  suits,” 
particularly  since  they  do  not  understand  our  work 
anyway.  In return, the typical suits fear that the typical 
engineer is out of control, causing them to complain, 
“We  can’t  afford  any  more  runaway  technology 
products… He’s got a technology solution looking for 
a  problem”  [12].    This  leads  to  a  culture  of  mutual 
distrust,  where  each  group  is  tempted  to  segregate 
themselves as much as possible. 
 
I  have  known  roughly  thirty  people  who  worked  for 
small  firms  run  by  former  hardware  or  software 
developers.  In some cases, these developers had risen 
through  the  ranks  and  now  occupied  a  powerful 
position;  others  had  amassed  enough  capital  to  start 
their own firms.  The result?  All except one of those 
firms  has  now  collapsed, or is stagnant, or has been 
acquired for a dime on the dollar. 
 
It is conceivable that a developer could gain enough 
business background to successfully run a company.  I 
simply have not seen it happen.  Instead, what seems to 
be  more  fruitful  is  for  engineers  to  aim  for  enough 
familiarity with business so they can communicate with 
businesspeople and recognize expertise when the see it; 
that way, they can identify who to hire, partner with, or 
work for. 
 
Curtis’s  layered  behavioral  model  of  software 
development provides a structure for prescribing how 
this  maturation  should  proceed  as  a  developer  rises 
through a firm’s ranks [11].  At the lowest level within 
his model, the “individual” level, developers have no 
need  for  business  concerns.    At  the  next  level,  the 
“team” level, social concerns dominate; here, a healthy 
team  will  respect  one  another’s  abilities  (business-
related or otherwise) and may call on one another for 
help.  But at the “project” level, organizational issues 
begin to dominate; at this point, the project manager is 
at least partly concerned with the business goals of the 
organization and should be capable of communicating 
with businesspeople.  Surely, by the time an engineer 
leads  at  the  “company”  level  as  a  CTO  or  the 
equivalent,  he  should  be  capable  of  articulating  the 
relationship  between  technical  and  economic  issues.  
Yet he may not have enough breadth of expertise to 
lead  the  entire  firm  on  his  own,  particularly  once  a 
company has grown large and complex.  At this point, 
he  probably  has  no  choice  but  to  work  with  the 
specialists: the suits. 
 
Since Curtis introduced this model in the late 1980’s, 
he has also used it as a framework for prescribing how 
the organization’s workforce as a whole should mature.  
This  maturation  process  involves  standardizing, 
measuring,  and  optimizing  workforce  competency 
(much  like  CMM,  but  applied  to  people  rather  than 
process).    According  to  this  extended  model,  more 
mature  organizations  possess  superior  business 
acumen.  Indeed, at the highest levels of maturity, “the 
organization  can  predict  whether  it  will  have  the 
competencies  to  satisfy  future  business  objectives” 
[10]. 
 
Now, the software industry abounds with examples of 
clever engineers who gave their firm a good start, then 
hired  skilled  business  managers  later  during  the 
transition  from  small-scale  to  large-scale  business 
strategy.    For  example,  Google’s  engineer  founders 
(Brin  and  Page)  hired  an  experienced  business 
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the  sales  plan  and  a  veteran  executive  (Schmidt)  to 
serve  as  CEO  and  “resident  adult.”   Likewise, when 
Oracle nearly went bankrupt a few years after opening, 
its engineer founder (Ellison) gutted the management 
crew  and  replaced  them  with  more  experienced 
businesspeople.  And amid one of the biggest success 
stories of all, the engineer founders of Microsoft (Gates 
and Allen) hired a business manager (Ballmer) with a 
background in economics and mathematics specifically 
to handle resource allocation. 
 
In  these  cases  and  many  others,  the  company  was 
founded  on  a  solid  vision  combining  real  customer 
needs with core technical strengths.  The founders had 
enough savvy to run a business plan for a few years, 
and then either ran into trouble or otherwise realized 
the  need  to  hire  managers  with  extensive  business 
experience.  In other words, they eventually found it 
appropriate to bring to bear a more specialized tool—
that  is,  a  dedicated  businessperson—to  meet  the 
challenge of allocating resources. 
 
This  brings  us  back  to  the  sub-question,  “Is  this  a 
feature  that  deserves  a  significant  allocation  of 
resources?”   The first key to answering it is to realize 
that  as  software  engineers,  we  do  not  necessarily 
always  know  the  optimal  answer—and  to  realize  the 
need for working with people who can help find better 
answers.
4 
 
In  some  cases,  the  best  answer will be that the firm 
should indeed allocate resources.  In other situations, it 
may  be  necessary  to  provide  features  without 
significant allocation of resources. 
 
5.3.2 Enhancement on the cheap 
This, of course, raises the interesting question of how 
to  enhance  the  product  without  spending  resources.  
                                                            
4  The  road  is  “two-way”:  Businesspeople  need  input 
from  technical  personnel,  as  well,  particularly  when 
setting  development  schedules.    As  McCarthy  has 
written, “It’s utter madness that in many organizations 
the  dates,  the  features,  and  the  resources—the  holy 
triangle—of  a  software  development  project  are 
dictated  by  people  unfamiliar  with  developing 
software.  Too often people like ‘Upper Management’ 
or ‘Marketing’ or some other bogeymen conjure up the 
date. …  It should be a fundamental dogma that the 
person  who  has  to  do  the  work  should  predict  the 
amount of time it will take” [18].  In other words, not 
only do engineers need the suits, but the suits also need 
the engineers, if the enterprise is to succeed! 
Obviously,  however,  delivering  value  requires  some 
resources—or else that value would already have been 
provided a long time ago by a competitor! 
 
The key is to spend a partner’s resources—either your 
customer’s resources, or a 3
rd party’s resources. 
 
Partners will not help you enhance your product unless 
they see some value to themselves.  In P-Corp’s case, 
the  federal  government  played  the  role  of  partner, 
providing us with money to computerize instruments in 
order that the government’s society would benefit from 
better  health  care.    Moreover,  our  validation  clinics 
served  as  partners,  since  they  benefited  from  our 
software  for  free  during  the  validation  phase  while 
simultaneously providing data to enhance our database.  
Thirdly, our software interfaced with a few 3
rd party 
components  (such  as  the  custom  handheld  devices 
mentioned in Section 3). 
 
Partnerships take other forms, as well: 
 
•  Providing  an  open  API  so  that  your  user 
community can build extensions 
•  Establishing  an  online  bulletin  board  where 
customers can support one another 
•  Trading non-person-identifiable customer data 
with  another  firm  to  enhance  one  another’s 
ability  to  serve  the  customers  (subject  to 
limitations of existing contracts and anti-trust 
law, of course!) 
•  Offering  customers  the  ability  to  beta-test 
software, in exchange for bug reports 
 
Partnerships most naturally thrive in connection with a 
sharable  (“non-rival”)  asset.    Consider  again  the 
examples above: 
 
•  The  government  essentially  hired  P-Corp  to 
produce software to benefit society.  Software 
is  shareable  in  that  it  can  be  installed 
simultaneously on a computer at every single 
clinic  in  America  without  our  losing 
ownership. 
•  The  partnership  between  clinics  and  P-Corp 
pivoted on the fulcrum of shared data (and the 
shared software).  We each received a copy of 
the data and each used it to generate reports 
we also shared. 
•  Partnerships with 3
rd party component vendors 
depend  on  interfaces.    An  interface  is  a 
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parameters, and it is eminently sharable, as is 
information in general. 
 
Oversimplifying somewhat, there seem to be two main 
classes  of  assets  that  are  not  shareable.  The first is 
material objects, such as dollar bills or ingots of steel.  
The  second  is  portions  of  the space-time continuum, 
such as office space or a consultant’s attention (that is, 
the opportunity for a period of time to use the space of 
the consultant’s brain).   
 
It is probably much easier to develop a partnership on 
the  basis  of  shareable  assets.    Strictly  speaking,  if 
sharing  an  asset  does  not  reduce  the  asset’s  value 
whatsoever,  then  it  costs  you  nothing  to  form  the 
partnership.    In  such  a  case,  if  you  can  extract  any 
value from the partner, then you stand to gain on net. 
 
Thus, returning to the sub-question, “Can customers or 
partners  be  motivated  to  produce  this  feature?”,  the 
answer often lays in finding a shareable resource that 
your partner would value.  Then offer to exchange that 
resource for whatever enhancements you seek, just as 
P-Corp did. 
 
5.4 Strengths and dangers 
 
This strategy has two parts.  First, identify a vision and 
a plan, working with business experts as needed; this 
will allow you to decide whether to allocate your own 
resources toward each worthwhile feature.  Second, if 
allocating your own features does not make sense, then 
offer  a  shareable  resource  to  motivate  a  partner  to 
develop the feature for you. 
 
5.4.1 Strengths 
One strength of this strategy is that large customers (or 
3
rd party organizations) will naturally want the system 
to include extension points: large firms typically have 
more  technical  and  non-technical  resources  available 
than do small firms, and they will want to apply their 
resources  to  customize  and  enhance  the  system  to 
better fit their needs.  Hence, they might value APIs for 
plugging in their own reports, or APIs for extracting 
data  and  performing  custom  analyses.    In  such 
situations,  it  may  be  an  “easy  sell”  to  get  these 
customers to build enhancements and complementary 
software.   
 
In  such  situations,  the  customer  will  probably  retain 
ownership of the intellectual property embodied by the 
customizations  and  enhancements.    This will prevent 
you from reselling the added value to other customers, 
yet this is fine.  If the customized, enhanced software 
better  meets  this  large  customer’s  needs,  then  that 
customer is somewhat more likely to want additional 
licenses.  As additional users adopt the software within 
this  large  organization,  they  may  apply  pressure 
(internally)  for  further  customizations  and 
enhancements, strengthening a positive feedback cycle.  
The  key  is  to  provide  assets  that  can  be  shared  by 
multiple installations (such as APIs for custom reports 
or data extraction).  The strength of this strategy is that 
many large customers may naturally want to participate 
in  the  resulting  feedback  cycle  because  they  receive 
value from it. 
 
Alternatively, the strategy presents a different strength 
for smaller companies.  These companies typically lack 
significant  technical  resources  for  creating  new 
software  features;  such  was  the  case  with  P-Corp’s 
clients.  In contrast, these companies are often fairly 
willing  to  experiment,  since  they  can  make  wide-
ranging changes to their business method without very 
much  bureaucratic  overhead.    For  example,  as 
mentioned  earlier,  one  P-Corp  site  performed  many 
internal experiments (because several of the clinicians 
had a research background) and offered an opportunity 
for P-Corp to improve the product without investing a 
great deal of our own resources. 
 
In  fact,  small  companies  vary  a  great  deal  in  their 
business  models,  hiring  strategies,  customer 
relationship  management  techniques,  and  virtually 
every other important aspect of running a business.  As 
such, they offer you a rich array of environments for 
performing experiments.  Thus, they represent a diverse 
testbed for deploying beta software.  The partner site 
benefits from getting to use your software for free, and 
your  software  organization  reaps  the  benefit  of  free 
testing.  (Of course, there is a limit to the quality of the 
resulting  data!    However,  that  tradeoff  always  exists 
any time you release some control over a process.) 
 
In short, the strategy of getting customers and partners 
to develop enhancements is “natural” in the sense that 
it can build on the varying strengths of both large and 
small firms. 
 
5.4.2 Dangers 
However,  the  strategy  is  not  without  its  pitfalls,  the 
most serious of which is the hidden costs involved in 
motivating  others  to  extend  your  system.    These  are 
manifold: 
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•  You  will  likely  need  to  hire  at  least  some 
business talent to help you decide whether to 
allocate your own resources.  Valuable talent 
never comes cheap. 
•  No  assets  are  perfectly  sharable  without  at 
least  some  depreciation  of  value.    At  the 
minimum,  any  assets  you  share  with  your 
partners might somehow fall into the hands of 
your  competitors,  potentially  strengthening 
their  ability  to  lure  away  your  customers.  
Alternatively,  if  you  share  enough  of  your 
APIs or documentation with your customers, 
they may no longer require your services (in a 
sense, becoming a competitor against you for 
their own business!) 
•  Even the most shareable asset requires an up-
front investment.  In our case, P-Corp spent 
manpower  applying  for  grants  before 
acquiring a partnership with the government; 
likewise,  we  needed  to  provide  data  to  the 
research-oriented  clinic  partners  before  they 
could analyze it and share their results with us.  
There is always a cost involved in creating the 
“kernel” within a shareable asset. 
 
Thus,  encouraging  your  partners  to  enhance  your 
system  does  not  come  free.    The  strategy  should  be 
viewed as a way of magnifying your own investments, 
rather than a way of getting something for nothing. 
 
Another  major  danger  is  that,  done  improperly, 
encouraging  your  customers  to  invest  their  resources 
may cause them to seek another vendor.  For example, 
one  commonly  voiced  complaint  about  Microsoft  is 
that they release numerous bugs in their software, and 
users sometimes feel as if they are forced to do beta 
testing  for  the  vendor  (with  little  corresponding 
recompense for their effort and hassle).  In a parallel 
vein, 3
rd party partners might become irritated, if any 
ambiguities  exist  about  ownership  of  intellectual 
property; costly lawsuits might result. 
 
Ameliorating this danger requires risk management, a 
key skill taught in many business curricula (and ISRI’s 
MSE program).  However, it also requires a good feel 
for  partners’  needs  and  an  understanding  of  how  far 
they  can  be  pushed  to  invest  their  own  resources.  
Some people seem to have this talent, whereas others 
develop some approximation of it as a skill.  It is an 
indispensable  asset  for  your  team  if  you  choose  to 
pursue this strategy. 
 
6. Lingering meta-questions 
 
6.1 Checkpoint 
 
Thus  far,  this  practicum  has  outlined  a  series  of 
challenges in question form and provided answers in 
strategy  form.    At  the  earliest  phase,  the  question  is 
how  to  convince  customers  to  purchase  software;  in 
response,  I  have  argued  that  features  should  address 
business  (not  just  technical)  needs.    Later  on,  the 
question becomes how to encourage users to actually 
adopt the software; for this, I have prescribed in-depth 
contextual analysis and a modular design that facilitates 
adding  new  features  over  time.    However,  because 
resources are finite, a question arises how to provide 
features  that  fall  outside  your  focus;  in  response,  I 
highlighted  the  importance  of  being  willing  to  work 
with people who specialize in resource allocation, and I 
suggested  encouraging  partners  to  provide 
enhancements that fall outside your focus. 
 
On  the  surface,  these  seem  like  three  fairly  generic 
answers  to  three  fairly  generic  questions.    To  what 
extent  are  these  questions  “appropriate”  for  software 
engineers to focus on? 
 
Loosely speaking, this concern could conceptually be 
visualized  in  a  chart  (figure  1)  depicting  where 
society’s  brain-power  should  be  expended.    For 
example, cell A would indicate the amount of brain-
power that should be invested by society into software 
engineering topics that are covered by this practicum’s 
three questions; cell C would indicate the amount that 
should be invested into software engineering topics that 
are not covered by this practicum’s three questions.   
 
Under the philosophical assumption that the allocation 
of society’s brain-power should be allocated in order to 
maximize the success of a randomly selected American 
firm, cells A, B, C, and D would then be the “expected 
value”  of  brain-power  allocation  averaged  over  all 
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(Fig 1: Conceptual depiction of brain-power allocation) 
 
Using  this  model,  the  key  meta-question  “To  what 
extent  are  these  three  questions  ‘appropriate’  for 
software engineers to focus on?” becomes “How does 
cell A compare to cell B and cell C?”  (Cell D is, of 
course,  much  less  interesting  since  it  is  outside  the 
scope of this practicum and of software engineering.)   
 
One way to approach this meta-question is to address it 
along each of the two dimensions. The answers have 
been  sprinkled  throughout  this  document,  and  the 
following  discussion  will  draw  them  together  into  a 
cohesive picture. 
 
6.2 Specificity to software engineering 
 
Horizontally, how does cell A compare to cell B?  That 
is,  to  what  extent  are  these  three  questions  (sales, 
adoption,  and  low-cost  enhancement)  specific  to 
software engineering?  The answer is that addressing 
these questions is more challenging for software than 
in other contexts.  Therefore, within the scope of these 
questions,  software  issues  demand  a  disproportionate 
amount of brain-power. 
 
6.2.1 Software’s nature exacerbates the challenges 
Three attributes of software make it especially difficult 
for  an  organization  to  address  this  practicum’s 
questions. 
 
First, I have called software an “enabling input.”  That 
is, its main benefit for many customers is efficiency; 
firms  can  usually  operate  (at  a  lower  efficiency) 
without  new software.  Thus, customers may be less 
convinced of its necessity, which can toughen the task 
of selling and choke the supply of revenue available for 
developing enhancements.   
 
Second,  software  is  intangible.    Because  customers 
cannot hold software in their hand, they may be less 
likely to feel an emotional sense of appreciation for the 
software; they may overlook its value.  So software’s 
intangibility reinforces the challenges resulting from its 
nature as an enabling input.  (Note, on the other hand, 
that  this  is  mitigated  by  the  fact  that  software’s 
intangibility  makes  it  more  shareable.    This  may 
facilitate the development of partnerships, lessening the 
difficulty  of  enhancing  the  system,  provided  that  the 
strategy of Section 5 is followed.) 
 
Finally,  software  is  complex.    Consequently, 
communicating  about  it  with  customers  can  become 
extremely  challenging.    In  particular,  it  becomes 
difficult to discuss how the system fits organizational 
and user-level needs.  But this conversation is essential 
to  motivating  organizations  to  buy  systems,  and 
motivating  users  to  use  the  software.    Hence,  the 
complexity of software can inhibit sales and adoption, 
and thereby reduce the supply of revenue available for 
investing in enhancements. 
 
6.2.2 Software’s milieu exacerbates the challenges 
Moreover, the culture of people around software makes 
sales,  adoption,  and  low-cost  enhancement  more 
difficult. 
 
First, purchasers of software have developed a mindset 
that software should be very inexpensive.  This attitude 
seems to be deepening, in fact, perhaps because of the 
ready supply of free software available on the internet.
5 
Consequently, over the past couple decades, customers 
have  demanded  and  received  increasing  value  from 
software  while  paying  decreasing  (or  comparable) 
prices  [16].    Moreover,  with  the  steadily  increasing 
export of cheap skilled labor from Asia, it is hard to 
imagine the trend reversing any time soon.  This may 
continue to put pressure on American firms attempting 
to sell software at a price adequate for covering costs, 
                                                            
5 Of course, the mere existence of the internet has no 
effect on software prices.  But its existence facilitates 
searching  for  software  vendors,  which  can  reduce 
switching  costs  and  boost  competition.    In  high-
competition  scenarios,  list  prices  fall  to  match  the 
marginal cost of production, which is essentially zero 
for  intangible  information  goods  like  software  [21].  
Unwinding this line of reasoning, then, the intangible 
nature  of  software  may  ultimately  be  responsible  for 
this deepening cultural expectation that software should 
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and  also  lessen  the  amount  of  money  available  for 
enhancements. 
 
Secondly,  a  significant  culture  of  mistrust  exists 
between businesspeople and software developers.  Yet 
responsible  engineering  focuses  on  being  both 
economical and technically efficient, so engineers are 
faced with the responsibility of straddling this gap of 
mistrust.    For  some  business  domains,  such  as 
accounting  or  marketing  services,  the  gap  between 
practice  and  management  is  somewhat  smaller.    But 
software  development  falls  in  the  category  of 
disciplines  where  the  gap  is  rather  large.    The 
concomitant  distrust  can  interfere  with  our  ability  to 
work together toward common goals: sales, adoption, 
and enhancement.  In this respect, the job of a software 
engineer is especially challenging. 
 
In short, software is an intangible, complex, enabling 
input.    Moreover,  it  exists  in  a  milieu  where  buyers 
demand cheap software, and the suits struggle with the 
developers  amid  delivering  the  product.    Taking  the 
combination  of  these  overlapping  factors,  it  seems 
likely  that  software  development  firms  will  find  this 
practicum’s three questions more challenging than will 
non-software firms.  Consequently, members of society 
will  need  to  allocate  “extra”  brain-power  to  getting 
software  firms  past  those  questions;  in  the  terms  of 
figure 1, cell A should receive an extra allotment that 
cell B would not need.  
 
6.3 Centrality to software engineering 
 
Vertically, how does cell A compare to cell C?  That is, 
to  what  extent  are  these  three  questions  central  to 
software engineering?  People apparently disagree on 
the answer here.  First, the “opposition…” 
 
6.3.1 Arguing for engineers to ignore these questions 
It is important to acknowledge that cell C of figure 1 
contains  a  huge  array  of  important  non-business 
software  engineering  concerns  not  covered  by  this 
practicum.    These  include  improvement  of  software 
quality, development of tools, codification of software 
architectures,  optimization  of  computational  resource 
usage, and so forth.   
 
“Software engineering” has traditionally encompassed 
a wide array of technical issues like these.  To carry 
this line of thought forward, consider that Parnas wrote, 
“The  concerns  of  those  who  attended  the  Software 
Engineering conferences in the late 60s were technical 
or scientific” [19]—that is, even from the inception of 
“software  engineering”  as  a  term,  the  field  has 
emphasized technical issues. 
 
Moreover,  Parnas  spends  much  of  that  article 
lamenting the unprofessional, lackadaisical attitude of 
many so-called “engineers” toward technical concerns.  
These include a willingness to accept bad designs, to 
produce  un-maintainable  code,  and  to  leave  systems 
poorly  documented.    He  decries,  “Software 
Engineering is often the subject of some very shallow 
courses and books taught, not in Engineering Faculties 
but in Science Departments.  Many people who have 
the  title,  ‘software  engineer’  in  their  jobs  have  no 
education in any technical field at all” [19].   
 
Metaphorically speaking, the argument reduces to this: 
Software  engineers  are  still  chewing  the  discipline’s 
technical meat.  Are we really also ready for a side of 
potatoes  in  the  form  of  this  practicum’s  business 
questions? 
 
6.3.2 Arguing for engineers to address these questions 
The argument above is not intended as a “straw-man,” 
as I think it accurately reflects the thinking of many 
people involved in the software industry.  For example, 
most  “software  engineer”  job  postings  on  dice.com 
focus  on  technical  skills  (such  as  “5-7+  years  of 
programming  in  C++/C#  on  Windows  platforms”), 
perhaps  mixed  with  a  smattering  of  team  leadership 
skills.  In other words, the emphasis lays heavily on the 
“individual”  and  “team”  levels  of  Curtis’s  layered 
behavioral  model  of  software  development,  where 
business  skills  are  essentially  unnecessary  [11];  job 
requirements concerning the “project” and “company” 
levels are non-existent or vestigial at best. 
 
However,  I  believe  that  the  preceding  argument 
constitutes  a  skewed  reading  of  Parnas’s  paper  and 
represents an anemic philosophy of what “engineering” 
entails. 
 
First, in the same article, Parnas writes, “A Professional 
Engineer  is  expected  to make sure that the technical 
problem being solved is the client’s real problem” [19].  
This  means  the  engineer  is  responsible  for 
understanding the client’s needs, as I have argued in 
Sections 3 and 4 of this document. 
 
He continues, “Engineers are expected to look at the 
‘whole problem’ not just at the technical problems that 
are  their  specialty.”    This  is  consistent  with  Curtis’s 
view  in  which  the  problem  develops  out  of  a  multi-
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“business  milieu”  and  “company”  layers  [11].  
Addressing the “whole problem” demands an ability to 
understand and cope with the political, economic, and 
organizational  aspects  emanating  from  these  higher 
layers. 
 
Indeed, by a dictionary definition, “engineering” is “the 
application of scientific and mathematical principles to 
practical  ends  such  as  the  design,  manufacture,  and 
operation  of  efficient  and  economical  structures, 
machines,  processes,  and  systems”  [1]  (emphasis 
added).  Focusing exclusively on technical efficiency 
ignores engineering’s vital economical aspect.  Simply 
put: in engineering, some equations have dollar signs. 
 
Second,  I  feel  the  “ignore  business”  argument 
embodied  in  the  preceding  sub-section  represents  an 
anemic philosophy of what “engineering” entails.  This 
is  highlighted  by  contrasting  the  above  definition  of 
“engineering” with the definition of “science”:  “The 
observation,  identification,  description,  experimental 
investigation,  and  theoretical  explanation  of 
phenomena” [1].  One key difference is that “science,” 
unlike “engineering,” does not imply practical ends. 
 
Respectable scientists can take incremental steps and 
leave a half-complete result.  Not so with engineering 
practice.  Proper engineering practice connotes closure, 
completeness, and utility.  This was recognized as far 
back  as  the  1968  NATO  Conference  on  Software 
Engineering  and  expressed  by  Perlis:  “We  are  not 
interested in modest systems which do only half the job 
that one would ordinarily expect; that is too modest.”  
He emphasized the importance of usefulness when he 
later commented on education: “It is also the case that 
almost  all  the  Computer  Science  departments  are 
turning out PhD’s who do not do computer software 
engineering under any stretch of that term’s meaning. 
You have to look hard to find anything that is dedicated 
to utility as a goal” [5] (emphasis added). 
 
By  this  reasoning,  a  robust  philosophy  of 
engineering—distinct  from  programming  and  distinct 
from  science—demands  an  emphasis  on  practical 
usefulness. 
 
What,  then,  are  the  natural  metrics  of  system 
usefulness?  One is sales.  Another is adoption.  A third 
is  whether  enhancements  are  being  added  to  meet 
additional  needs.    These  are  the  focus  of  this 
practicum’s three questions. 
 
To  summarize,  I  believe  that  the  practicum’s  three 
business questions are indeed central to engineering.  It 
is true that substantial brain-power should be allocated 
to the technical issues of cell C in figure 1.  But to what 
end?  Engineering necessarily implies an emphasis on 
usefulness, not merely producing systems that no one 
values.  Therefore, if we want to be real “engineers,” 
addressing cell A is a necessary corollary to addressing 
cell C. 
 
Parnas  would  probably  label  this  an  issue  of 
“professionalism,” which resonates with me.  When I 
left academia in 1998 and entered P-Corp, I was not a 
professional: I was a hacker.  But when I left in 2000, I 
had learned bytes were of no use unless they improved 
lives:  P-Corp  is  where  I  started  becoming  a 
professional. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
7.1 Discussion 
 
This practicum has covered three questions concerning 
the fostering of sales, adoption, and enhancement.  The 
unifying  thrust  is  to  cooperate  with  your  customers, 
users, and partners.  Understand the pressures on them, 
understand  their  workflow,  and  understand  how  to 
motivate them to use and enhance your product.  Work 
with them. 
 
In retrospect, it strikes me as bizarre that these lessons 
would need to be learned at all.  It may be that budding 
engineers’ experiences in high school and college train 
them  to  think  in  an  individualistic  and  self-centered 
fashion. Many programming projects, most homework 
assignments, and all exams are assigned and graded on 
a per-student basis.   
 
Equally  significantly,  most  academic  problems  are 
textbook-perfect,  glossing  over  the  dirty  real-world 
constraints of the business world and the difficulty of 
making software actually useful.  Young programmers 
are  usually  positively  frightened  of  extended 
conversations with customers.  (We used to joke that 
we deserved “hazard pay” every time we had to put on 
a suit and tie.)  Perhaps, as Perlis suggested, this can be 
attributed  to  the  fact  that  computer  programmers are 
trained in a programming-oriented or science-oriented 
curriculum, rather than an engineering-focused milieu.  
If this is the case, then upon entering a real working 
environment, it may be necessary to “unlearn” some of 
those  traits.    Absorbing  the  three  strategies  I  have 
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7.2 Directions for research 
 
Of course, a single data point like my experience at P-
Corp hints at plenty of additional questions outside the 
scope of my answers.  Some might lead to interesting 
research  projects  in  software  engineering.    Here  are 
some ideas: 
 
•  Have the HIPAA requirements actually cost as 
much  as  clinics  expected?    What aspects of 
the  requirements  turned  out  to  be  most 
onerous to implement?  What new government 
regulations,  in  general,  took  effect  in  the 
medical computing world in the 1990’s?  Is 
there a particular type of requirement that can 
be  characterized  as  especially  expensive?  
How  can  we  quantify  the  benefits  of  these 
requirements, and how can we build a model 
for  making  engineering-informed  policy 
decisions about electronic requirements in the 
medical practice domain? 
•  One subtle validity problem with OM is that 
after  clinics  start  using  the  system,  their 
patient  data  gets  aggregated  back  into  the 
normative base: As a result, the “norms” begin 
to  confound  data  for  patients  who  never 
received  treatment  with  data  from  patients 
who  did  receive  treatment.    This  raises  a 
general  question  applicable  to  any  system 
which collects new data, classifies it against 
old data, prompts humans to affect that new 
data  (e.g.:  through  treatment),  and  then 
aggregates  the  modified  new  data  with 
unmodified old data.  Over time the semantics 
of the classification scheme gradually change.  
How can this shift in meaning be adequately 
communicated to the users?  How can the shift 
be quantified and put under the control of the 
users  in  a  usable  fashion?    How  can  we 
characterize the categories of software where 
we care about this problem—and those where 
we don’t care? 
•  Often, in the world of introductory academic 
economics or engineering, we fail to discuss 
the  legal  implications  of  implementing  our 
systems.   It would be interesting to do case 
studies of situations where clients reneged on 
software development contracts, or even sued 
the  vendor,  as  well  as  situations  where  the 
vendor was sued by third parties or prosecuted 
by  government  entities.    Based  on  these 
studies, what factors seem to contribute most 
to  generating  legal  problems?  How can we 
build  a  model  of  how  our  software 
engineering  decisions  connect  to  the 
probability  of  a  lawsuit  or  prosecution?    In 
what  areas  can  we  get  quantitative?    What 
features deserve emphasis in validating such a 
model? 
•  This practicum has covered the importance of 
uncovering  as  many  pieces  of  the  “whole 
problem”  as  possible  during  the  design 
process.    There  are  many  ways  to  do  this; 
contextual design is just one.  But choosing 
among these methodologies is currently based 
on  guesswork  and  instinct.    Can  we 
characterize  the  situations  in  which  one 
methodology  is  superior  to  another?    More 
subtly,  what  if  the  optimal  method  is  a 
function of the underlying business problem?  
How  can  we  choose  the  right  method  for 
uncovering  business  problems  before  we 
know  what  the  problem  is?    How  can  we 
design and validate a formal iterative process 
to handle this? 
•  Researchers  have  made  a  number  of  forays 
into  understanding  how  the  user’s  mind 
functions while he uses software.  However, I 
am  unaware  of  any  research  attempting  to 
model how the user’s mind makes connections 
between his software and his workflow.  How 
does the user’s perception of his “work” affect 
how he reacts to the software?  How does the 
user  “figure  out”  when  the  software  (as  a 
whole) is worth adopting?  For instance, this 
practicum mentioned viewing one’s self as an 
artist (and other self-perceptive issues) as one 
factor  in  whether  a  user  wants  to  use  the 
software.  What other “sensitivity points” can 
we hit in order to optimize the adoptability of 
our software products?   
 
These  are  only  a  few  of  the  possible  directions  for 
future research.  Of course, some will turn out to be 
dead ends.  However, others may hold the promise of 
better  integrating  software  engineering  into  business 
practice. 
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